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THE "INTELLIGENT WICKEDNESS"1 OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
CONFERRING CITIZENSHIP TO CHILDREN BORN ABROAD
AND OUT-OF-WEDLOCK A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
United States citizenship laws treat women as sexually responsible be-
ings while condoning the sexual irresponsibility of men.2 The significance
of this critique is that citizenship laws define us as citizens and as a nation. 3
1. See William Lloyd Garrison, Intelligent 'Wickedness, in FEMINISM: THE
ESSENTkL HISTOUCiAL WRITINGS 86-89 (Miriam Schneii ed., 1992) (quoting speech
given by Garrison in response to. criticism of Seneca Falls Declaration of
Sentiments at convention in 1853).
There is such a thing as intelligent wickedness, a design on the part of
those who have the light to quench it, and to do the wrong to gratify their
own propensities, and to further their own interests. So, then, I believe,
that as man has monopolized for generations all the rights which belong
to woman, it has not been accidental, not through ignorance on his part;
but I believe that man has done this through calculation, actuated by a
spirit of pride, a desire for domination which has made him degrade wo-
man in her own eyes, and thereby tend to make her a mere vassal.
Id. at 87-88.
2. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(criticizing plurality's upholding of citizenship law that differentially regulates abil-
ity of unwed citizen parents to convey citizenship to their children born abroad
and out-of-wedlock).
3. See Kif Augustine-Adams, Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citi-
zenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 93, 94 (2000) (contrasting analysis of Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), against similar citizenship cases in Japan, Ban-
gladesh, Botswana and Canada). The formal model of citizenship has taken on
renewed salience in domestic and international affairs as countries, like the United
States, increasingly restrict movement in response to international terrorism, such
as the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
See id. (noting importance-of citizenship laws). For example, in response to the
September 11, 2001 terrorism attacks, President George W. Bush restricted the
issuance of foreign student visas as a means of tightening U.S. borders. See The
FOX 10 O'clock News (FOX television broadcast, Oct. 29, 2001) (reporting President
Bush's response to terrorism attacks).
The effect of gendered citizenship laws is felt not only by aliens, but also by
U.S. citizens and frequently at the most personal level. See Linda Kelly, Republican
Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection
Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 557, 560 (2000) (noting that
scholars have ignored evaluating pervasiveness of gender biases in immigration
law). Domestically, immigration laws are used to deport non-citizens, often un-
justly. See generally MatthewJ. Droskoski, Casebrief, Criminal Aliens Get Pinched: San-
doval v. Reno, AEDPA's and IIPIRA's Effect on Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 45 VILL. L.
REv. 711 (2000) (discussing judicial review of deportation orders pursuant to An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996). Internationally, such laws curb
the flow of aliens seeking refuge within the United States. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-40 (1987) (examining definition of "refugee" in United
Nations Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees where aliens were seeking asylum
(707)
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In the United States, there are only two sources of citizenship: birth and
naturalization. 4 Citizenship at birth either derives from place of birth (jus
soli) or from parentage (jus sanguinis).5 When citizenship stems from par-
entage, U.S. citizenship laws differentiate the power of unwed American
parents to convey formal citizenship to their out-of-wedlock children born
abroad on the basis of gender. 6 The distinction drawn by U.S. citizenship
laws is gendered subordination that is not by chance, but rather is a result
or withholding from deportation); see also United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 (acknowledging problem posed
because of new refugee situations that have developed since Geneva Convention
was originally adopted). In light of the growing restrictions upon immigration,
how nations delineate the procedures to acquire formal citizenship is even more
vital.
To ensure some semblance of consistency, countries individually ratify treaties
in which they promise to abstain from upholding laws, including citizenship laws,
that discriminate on the basis of sex. See Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 5-
12, Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (arguing that Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in conjunction with comments made
by Human Rights Committee requires United States to strike down 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a)). Under Article VI of the Constitution, all treaties entered into by the
United States are deemed to be "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has previously looked to
international law when faced with an issue on the interpretation of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1999)
(turning to United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and to
Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Defining Refugees (Geneva 1979) for definition of refugee);
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-40 (turning to same treaty when distinguishing
between two standards for refugees seeking asylum). As such, international law
strongly argues against upholding gender-based conveyance of U.S. citizenship
under § 1409(a). See Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 3, Nguyen (No. 99-
2071) (arguing that finding of unconstitutionality would serve as model for other
countries).
4. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-03 (1898) (explaining
that persons born outside of United States only acquire citizenship by birth pursu-
ant to acts of Congress); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 423 (citing Wong Kim and ex-
plaining that Fourteenth Amendment is source of conveying citizenship by birth)
(citation omitted). The Fourteenth Amendment primarily relies upon jus soli citi-
zenship rules to convey citizenship at birth. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stat-
ing that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... "). This type of citizen-
ship is granted to persons based on their place of birth. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (a)
(1994) (conveying citizenship at birth to persons born in United States); BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus sol). U.S. citizenship for chil-
dren born abroad and out-of-wedlock, however, is granted on the basis of parent-
age, known as jus sanguinis citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994) (conveying
citizenship at birth to children born abroad and out-of-wedlock if one parent is
U.S. citizen); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 868 (defining jus sanguinis). For a further
discussion of jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship rules, see infra note 18 and ac-
companying text.
5. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 95 n.1 (explaining that while United
States primarily uses jus soli, it also uses jus sanguinis citizenship rules).
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (allowing women to convey citizenship automatically,
but requiring men to satisfy additional requirements). For a further discussion of
the language of § 1409, see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47: p. 707
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of calculated manipulation prompted by a desire for domination. 7 This
manipulation, termed "intelligent wickedness" by some feminist theorists,8
While the term "gender" is often used interchangeably with the term "sex,"
this Comment will not equate these terms as one and the same. See BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 480 (defining sex discrimination as "[d]iscrimination based on gen-
der, esp. against women. - Also termed gender discrimination."). In this Com-
ment, the term "gender" implicates more than the "sum of the peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female organism." BLAcK's
LAw DICTIONARY 1379. Instead, to be gender female means having an identity im-
posed externally that people have ascribed to you, rather than possessing an iden-
tity that you are born with. See CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 7
(1987) ("For the female, subordination is sexualized in a way that dominance is for
the male, as pleasure as well as gender identity, as femininity.").
Furthermore, this Comment intentionally utilizes the term "out-of-wedlock
children" rather than "illegitimate children" because the latter term is disputed.
7. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE: ON SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION 32-34 (1984) (exploring feminist legal theories, known as difference
and dominance theories, which hold that reality is constructed to support men's
lives and, at most, women's biological differences are relegated to footnotes).
MacKinnon notes that:
Under the sameness [or dominance] standard, women are measured ac-
cording to our correspondence with man, our equality judged by our
proximity to his measure. Under the difference standard, we are mea-
sured according to our lack of correspondence with him, our woman-
hood judged by our distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus
simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the
female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the
referent for both.... Approaching sex discrimination in this way-as if
sex questions are difference questions and equality questions are same-
ness questions-provides two ways for the law to hold women to a male
standard and call that sex equality.
Id. at 34. MacKinnon explains that there are two alternate paths to equality for
women: they can either be the same as men or be different from men. See id. at 33
(discussing notion that equality calls for sameness but sex requires recognition of
differences). Gender neutrality, the leading path, ascribes by the former ap-
proach. See id. (characterizing it as "the single standard philosophically"). In con-
trast, equal protection rules also recognize and account for biological differences,
such as pregnancy (a "doctrinal embarrassment"), through special benefit rules or
special protection rules legally. See id. (characterizing this path as "the double
standard philosophically"). "For women to affirm difference, when difference
means dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities and char-
acteristics of powerlessness." Id. at 39.
8. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 86-89 (blaming men for subordination of wo-
men). Namely, William Lloyd Garrison emphasized that what men have done is
make women look at themselves differently through the eyes of men. See id. at 87-
88. Moreover, Virginia Woolf posits the correlate; that is, men insist upon the
inferiority of women, making them like mirrors, to enlarge themselves. See Vir-
ginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own, in FEMINISM: THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRIT-
INGS, supra note 1, at 347, 347 (claiming mirrors are essential to all violent and
heroic action). Specifically, she comments that "[w]omen have served all these
centuries as looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting
the figure of man at twice its natural size. Without that power probably the earth
would still be swamp and jungle. The glories of all our wars would be unknown."
Id. at 346.
Men have normalized the oppression of women and condoned retribution for
their resistance of it through the development of cultural norms and its incorpora-
2002]
3
Lalwani: The Intelligent Wickedness of U.S. Immigration Law Conferring Cit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
710 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47: p. 707
imposes and manages unjust gender schemas. 9
tion in the law. For instance, Islamic fundamentalist regimes, such as the Taliban,
use the rhetoric of religion to ban Afghan women from obtaining education, medi-
cal care or emulating anything that resonates in Western values. See Primetime
Thursday (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 1, 2001) (relating story of one under-
ground woman doctor who was about to graduate from medical school when
Taliban came into power; she stated, "I want to be an educated person and also a
political person. . . . I feel that I don't belong here. I feel that this, is not my
country."); Kathy Pollitt, The Way We Live Now: Questions For Sajeda Hayat and Sehar
Saba; Tearing at the Veil, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 23 (question-
ing two women representatives of Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghani-
stan (RAWA)). The Taliban is not alone in deterring their women from the path
of education. The Masai tribe, one of the forty-two tribes in Kenya, routinely prac-
tices genital cutting and early marriage of "their most precious and pliable re-
sources, their daughters," as young as nine to the older men within their tribe. See
Ian Fisher, Sometimes a Girl's Best Friend Is Not Her Father; Kajiado Journa N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 1999, at 4 ("'[The Masai] feel that when a girl goes to school she gets
spoiled because she gets to a point where she is equal to the men. But she's not
supposed to be equal."'). Consequently, one Kenyan boarding school in the town
of Kajiado has erected chain-linked fences topped with barbed wire to deter Masai
fathers from stealing their daughters away. See id. (discussing suspicion surround-
ing education for girls).
Should these women resist their oppression, they risk having acid thrown in
their face, being stoned to death or killed at the hands of their own family mem-
bers. See, e.g., Kristen Golden, Rana Husseini: A Voice for Justice, Ms., July/August
1998, at 36, 36-39 (reporting on honor killings for women who have been victims
of rape and incest, as well as those who have committed adultery); Pollitt, supra at
23 (asking about ramifications for being in RAWA if caught by Taliban); Liz Welch,
Facing the World, Ms., June/July 1999, at 33, 33-35 (discussing acid attacks on Ban-
gladeshi women and explaining that "'[w]ith acid, they usually aim for the face. It
symbolizes beauty. Taking away beauty takes away the woman's value."').
Moreover, the legal system in many countries supports the socialized subordi-
nation and oppression of women. For example, the Jordanian Penal Code, estab-
lished in 1960, uses the law of provocation to provide a reduction in penalty for a
man who kills to restore the honor that was lost by his wife committing adultery.
See Golden, supra at 36 (explaining that Jordanian men who are convicted of
honor killings generally serve as little as three months to one year in prison). A
little closer to home, the U.S. 19th century common law's marital tort immunity is
rooted in the English common law doctrine of chastisement under which hus-
bands were legally allowed to subject their wives to corporal punishment so long as
it was reasonable. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love" Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (characterizing preservation of chas-
tisement through transformation).
9. The term "gender schemas" refers to the internalization of typical sex-
based female and male characteristics and behaviors by adults to "construct an
identity that is consistent with social concepts of gender." See SANDRA BEM, LENSES
OF GENDER 138-39 (1998) (discussing gender formation). Furthermore, this term
alludes to the way these gender-based attributes have structured mainstream
thought and ideologies that are reflected back to us in legal doctrines and moral
philosophies. See MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 32 (holding mainstream doctrine of
law of sex discrimination responsible for ineffectiveness of sex equality laws in "get-
ting women what we need and are socially prevented from having on the basis of a
condition of birth . . ."). When our laws and moral ideologies support gender
schemas, they are further integrated, reinforced, imposed and managed into our
psyche. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in FEMI-
NISM IN OUR TIME, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT, supra
note 1, at 310, 325 (asking society to examine how heterosexuality has been organ-
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United States citizenship laws and the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of these laws perpetuate a core gender schema that women
must be sexually responsible, whereas men are allowed to be sexually irre-
sponsible. 10 Historically, women's sexual responsibility originated from
the principles of coverture.11 The U.S. common law doctrine of coverture
ized, managed, imposed and propagandized through lower female wage scales,
pink collar ghettos, withholding of education from women, sexual double stan-
dard, idealization of heterosexuality in art and literature, foot binding, chastity
belts, punishment for adultery and use of brides for dowery). In response to the
gender schema that assumes that women value morality differently than men,
MacKinnon responds:
Women value care because men have valued us according to the care we
give them, and we could probably use some. Women think in relational
terms because our existence is defined in relation to men. Further, when
you are powerless, you don'tjust speak differently. A lot, you don't speak.
Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is silenced .... All I am
saying is that the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into differ-
ences is an insult to our possibilities.
MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 39.
In upholding the gender-based distinctions within U.S. citizenship laws on the
basis of biology, the United States Supreme Court, in Nguyen v. INS and Miller v.
Albright, continued the cycle of imposing and managing gender schemas of female
sexual responsibility and male sexual irresponsibility. See generally Nguyen v. INS,
121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (holding that U.S. citizenship law, which makes it more
difficult for fathers than for mothers to convey citizenship to children born abroad
and out-of-wedlock, did not violate Fifth Amendment's equal protection guaran-
tee); Miller, 523 U.S. 420, 420 (1998) (finding § 1409(a) did not violate equal pro-
tection jurisprudence on various grounds). Furthermore, in doing so, the
Supreme Court failed to consider the growing international and national defer-
ence for equal parental responsibility and served to entrench gender schemas that
absolve men of this responsibility. See Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 2-3,
Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (arguing that § 1409(a) irra-
tionally formalizes traditional gender schemas about parenting).
10. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (upholding statute making it more diffi-
cult for child born abroad and out-of-wedlock to American father to claim citizen-
ship through that father under equal protection guarantee of Fifth Amendment);
Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that "mothers, as a
rule, are responsible for a child born out of wedlock; [unwed] fathers ... ordina-
rily, are not"); Ethan Bronner, Lawsuit on Sex Bias 6y, 2, Mothers, 17; Pregnancy Kept
Them From Honor Society, the Girls Contend, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998, at A14 (discuss-
ing sex discrimination law suit against school board brought by two unwed
mothers who were allegedly denied admission into National Honor Society be-
cause of pregnancy). The lawyer for one of the unwed mothers characterized the
situation as: "'It's making a girl wear a scarlet P and bear the burden for something
that is ajoint activity. No boy isbeing left out of the society for having engaged in
premarital sex."' Id. (quoting American Civil Liberties Union attorney represent-
ing one of plaintiffs). The ACLU became interested in this case because only the
student mothers were excluded from admission into the National Honor Society,
not the student fathers who also engaged in the premarital sex. See id. (explaining
that pregnancy has been controversial issue for membership in National Honor
Society before this case). Consequently, the ACLU viewed this as sex discrimina-
tion, actionable under "Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the [Fourteenth] Amendment .... Id.
11. For a further discussion, see infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text. Be-
cause the strict English common law doctrine of coverture held that an out-of-
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regarded out-of-wedlock children as the sole responsibility of unwed
mothers, while marital children were the property of fathers. 12 In 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a), Congress adopted the principles of coverture into U.S. citizen-
ship laws.) 3 More recently, inJune 2001, the Supreme Court further per-
petuated these gender schemas in its interpretation of section 1409(a) by:
(1) using biology as a pretext for treating women and men differently in
their ability to transmit citizenship to their children, and (2) manipulating
equal protection jurisprudence to free fathers from the responsibility of
wedlock child was "nullius fillius,-the son of no one," neither unwed parent had
responsibility towards that child. See Friesner v. Symonds, 20 A. 257, 259 (N.J.
Prerog. Ct. 1890) (noting that because mother of out-of-wedlock child is its natural
guardian, she must support child); see also State v. Tieman, 73 P. 375, 376 (Wash.
1903) (explaining that, in absence of statute, putative father has no legal obliga-
tion to support his out-of-wedlock child). American common law's adoption of
this doctrine, however, recognized early on that a mother of an out-of-wedlock
child is its natural guardian, and thus has a duty to support and care for the child.
See Friesner, 20 A. at 259 (granting letters of guardianship to applicant).
12. See, e.g., Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights Are Mothers'Duties: The
Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1680 (2000) (not-
ing that coverture set default rules for obtaining property and status through fa-
thers within marriage; outside marriage, children gained property and status
through mothers). See generally Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law
Center at 13-16, Nguyen y. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (tracing
origins of § 1409(a) back to common law doctrine of coverture).
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994) (discussing nationality at birth and collective
naturalization for children born out of wedlock); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 460
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality's holding for shaping governmental
policy to fit and reinforce gender schemas prevalent throughout U.S. history).
Section 1409 provides, in pertinent, that:
The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 1401 of this
title, and of paragraph (2) of section 1408 of this title, shall apply as of
the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if-
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of
the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide
financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18
years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's resi-
dence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing
under oath, or
(C). the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court. ...
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born ... outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be
held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the
mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such per-
son's birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in
the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous pe-
riod of one year.
[Vol. 47: p. 707
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caring for and supporting their out-of-wedlock children born abroad.14
The Supreme Court maintained the gender biases in section
1409(a) (4), both conceptually and practically. 15 Conceptually, the Court
manipulated the equal protection precedent to maintain outdated gender
schemas; while practically speaking, the Court formulated motherhood to
be biological and fatherhood to be legal.1 6 By adhering to the principles
of gender essentialism, the Court impacts parenthood by adopting a mon-
olithic notion of women's and men's experiences that requires no further
justification.' 7 While the United States is not alone in passing gender-
based jus sanguinisi 8 citizenship laws, it may, however, be in the minority
14. Cf Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2066 (classifying concerns of gender schemas as
mechanistic classifications). For a further discussion of the Court's analysis, see
infra notes 137-87 and accompanying text.
The truth gone unheard by the Supreme Court is that mothers and fathers
create citizens through their children because § 1409(a) instills parents with that
power, "not because biology requires or justifies any particular rule." See Augus-
tine-Adams, supra note 3, at 135. William Lloyd Garrison professed that when
truth is offered, the response by tyrants is defensiveness and silence. See Garrison,
supra note 1, at 89.
How has this Woman's Rights movement been treated in this country, on
the right hand and on the left? This nation ridicules and derides this
movement, and spits upon it, as fit only to be cast out and trampled un-
derfoot. This is not ignorance. They know all about the truth. It is the
natural outbreak of tyranny. It is because the tyrants and usurpers are
alarmed. They have been and are called to judgment, and they dread the
examination and exposure of their position and character.
Id. Likewise, the Supreme Court's response to the equal protection challenge of
§ 1409(a) resonates in defensiveness. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2066 (dismissing
truth as mechanistic contentions that "obscure those misconceptions and
prejudices that are real").
15. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Nguyen and
Miller and the practical impact of those holdings, see infra notes 137-208 and ac-
companying text.
16. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 99 (finding that gender essentialism
perpetuates continued use of gender schemas to create exclusive, discriminatory
nations and offering reformed U.S. citizenship law that rejects "a construction of
fatherhood as legal and motherhood as biological"). For a further discussion, see
infra notes 137-208 and accompanying text.
17. In this Comment, the term "gender essentialism" is used to describe the
tendency to adopt monolithic notions of women's and men's experiences that are
allegedly grounded in biology, thus requiring no further justifications. See Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 588
(1990) (criticizing gender essentialism for excluding other facets of experience,
such as race, class and sexual orientation).
18. Latin for "right of blood," jus sanguinis citizenship permits a child to ac-
quire citizenship based upon a parent's citizenship. See BLACK'S LAw DIcroNARV
868 (7th ed. 1999) (defining term). This is the most commonly followed citizen-
ship rule internationally. See id. (noting prevalence of citizenship rule). The
United States follows this rule in granting citizenship to children born abroad and
out-of-wedlock. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (providing citizenship to foreign-born out-of-
wedlock children on basis of U.S. parentage). The United States, however, prima-
rily grants citizenship based upon jus soli principles. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (deeming all persons born or naturalized in United States as citizens); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a) (1994) (stating qualifications to be deemed nationals and citizens at
7
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in upholding such laws on the basis of biology.19 Furthermore, in light of
recent developments in international law, the United States may be forced
to reconsider section 1409(a).
This Comment evaluates the Supreme Court's calculated manipula-
tion in upholding the legitimation requirement in section 1409(a)(4).
Part II examines the text of the statute in light of its origins.20 Further-
more, Part II notes the controversial impact of the plenary power doctrine
on equal protection jurisprudence. 2 1 Part III describes the two equal pro-
tection challenges to section 1409.22 Part IV explores the conceptual and
practical implications of the Court's holding.2 3 Finally, Part V discusses
the potential for reform of section 1409(a) upon ratification of a treaty
aimed at eliminating discrimination against women.2 4
birth). Jus soli, which is Latin for "right of soil," determines citizenship by place of
birth. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 868 (defining term). Consequently, virtually all
those born within the territories of the United States, including illegal aliens, are
deemed U.S, citizens at birth. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 95 n.. (apply-
ing principles of jus soli citizenship to U.S. citizenship law).
Unlike the United States (which primarily conveys citizenship based upon jus
soli), there are countries, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Japan and Germany, which
only convey citizenship based upon jus sanguinis principles. See Hosokawa Kiyoshi,
Japanese Nationality in International Perspective, in NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 177-253 (Ko Swan Sik ed., 1990) (discussing Japanese
citizenship laws); Gerald L. Neuman, Immigration and Judicial Review in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 23 N.Y.U'.'J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 55 n.106 (1990) (explaining
that German adherence to jus sanguinis citizenship means that children born to
alien parents within Federal Republic of Germany do not acquire German citizen-
ship); UNICEF, THE PROGRESS OF NATIONS 9 (1998), available at http://
www.unicef.org/pon98/pon98.pdf (noting that Bangladesh and Pakistan continue
to convey citizenship according to father's nationality).
19. See Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 21-23, Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct.
2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (exploring trend). Many countries amended their citi-
zenship laws in response to ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), includingJapan in 1985, Swit-
zerland in 1985, Italy in 1987, Vietnam in 1988, Luxembourg in 1989, Malta in
1989, Thailand in 1991, India in 1992, South*Africa in 1994 and Botswana in 1995.
See UNICEF, supra note 18, available at http:// www.unicef.org/pon98/pon98.pdf
at 9 (explaining that because of growing power of CEDAW, many patriarchal citi-
zenship laws have been amended to allow women to convey citizenship to their
children as required by Article 9 of CEDAW). In light of this growing legislative
trend to amend citizenship laws to grant parents the equal right to convey citizen-
ship to their children, the United States may be in the minority in upholding its
gender-based discriminatory citizenship laws.
20. For a further discussion of the text and history of § 1409, see infra notes
25-62 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the impact of the plenary power doctrine on
equal protection jurisprudence, see infra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion on Nguyen and Miller, see infra notes 93-136 and
accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion, see infra notes 137-208 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion, see infra notes 209-23 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Plain Language of Section 1409
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) states that citizenship will be conferred at
birth to an out-of-wedlock child born abroad if the child's parent is a U.S.
citizen that has lived in the United States for at least five years.25 This
provision, however, does not confer citizenship unless the requirements of
8 U.S.C. § 1409 are satisfied. 26 Under section 1409, an unwed citizen
mother automatically conveys citizenship to her foreign-born child upon
proof of U.S. nationality at the time of the child's birth and prior physical
presence in the United States for one year.27 For the citizen father, how-
ever, sections 1409(a) (1), (a) (3) and (a) (4) impose three additional re-
quirements. The unwed American father must: (1) prove biological
fatherhood by clear and convincing evidence; (2) provide a written state-
ment that he will provide financial support while the child is a minor; and
(3) legitimate, adjudicate or formally acknowledge paternity before the
child reaches eighteen years of age. 28 In essence, the unwed father must
establish a biological, financial and legal relationship with the out-of-wed-
lock child to convey citizenship. In contrast, the unwed mother simply
needs to establish a biological link to the child.29
B. Development of Section 1409(a)
As evidenced by the legislative development and the statutory frame-
work, section 1409(a) was designed to reinforce biased and suspect gender
schemas pertaining to women with children born out-of-wedlock.30 Al-
though the statute on its face appears to give an unwed mother the supe-
rior right to automatically convey citizenship to her child,, the provision is
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1994) (providing for nationality at birth and collec-
tive naturalization).
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994) (applying to § 1401(g)).
27. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (conveying citizenship to foreign-born out-of-wed-
lock child of citizen mother). While proving maternity is not explicitly required by
this provision, the Supreme Court seems to presume that it must be met. See
Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2061 (2001) (explaining that mother's status is
uniquely verifiable from event of birth and most often documented by birth certifi-
cates or hospital records); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 436 (1998) (same).
28. See8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1) (requiring that unwed father establish biological
relationship with out-of-wedlock child in order to convey citizenship); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 (a) (3) (requiring that unwed father establish financial relationship with out-
of-wedlock child in order to convey citizenship); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (4) (requiring
that unwed father establish legal relationship with out-of-wedlock child in order to
convey citizenship).
29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (qualifying citizenship for out-of-wedlock child
born to citizen mother). The language of the statute presumes that an unwed
citizen mother will establish biological maternity before conveying citizenship. See
id. (failing to explicitly require proof of maternity).
30. For a further discussion of the development of § 1409, see infra notes 31-
62 and accompanying text.
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actually an extension of the doctrine of coverture. 3 1 Under this doctrine,
an unwed father has no responsibility for his out-of-wedlock child absent
legitimation; thus, to convey citizenship, he must first legitimate pater-
nity.32 In contrast, because coverture places sole responsibility for an out-
of-wedlock child on the unwed mother, legitimation is unnecessary for her
to convey citizenship. Additionally, the predecessor to section 1409
adopted the common law doctrine of coverture, thus signifying an attempt
to preserve and reinforce the gender-based schemas about unwed mothers
and fathers.33
1. Common Law Tradition of Coverture
Under the common law doctrine of coverture, married women did
not legally exist.34 Their legal identity was merged .with their husbands,
giving the husbands complete legal control over their wives and marital
children.35 Consequently, fathers had no responsibility for their out-of-
wedlock children unless they chose to legitimate them; these children
were the sole responsibility of their mother.3 6
Because under English common law, a bastard 37 child was "nullius
filius,-the son of no one," neither parent had to support such a child. 38
31. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 17-18, Nguyen
v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (applying doctrine of coverture to
U.S. citizenship statute relating to out-of-wedlock children). For a further discus-
sion on the doctrine of coverture, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 19, Nguyen 121
S. Ct. 2053 (applying doctrine of coverture to U.S. citizenship statue relating to
out-of-wedlock children).
33. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1690 (noting that Nationality Act of 1940 was
precursor to § 1409). For a further discussion of the Nationality Act of 1940, see
infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
34. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 ("By marriage, the hus-
band and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being, or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage .... ).
35. See id. at *44142 (explaining that husband had legal responsibility for
wife's actions, debts and maintenance and had custodial rights over child's labor);
Collins, supra note 12, at 1682 n.61 (citing same); see, e.g.,Jackson v. Jackson, 8 Or.
402, 403 (Or. 1880) (explaining that under common law, "a father has the para-
mount right to the care and custody of his minor children, unless ... he is a man
of grossly immoral principles or habits, or that he has not the ability to provide for
them, or that they have been ill-used by him").
36. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1686-87 (noting that this rule reinforced cov-
erture's basic principle of patrilineal property and status transmission in mar-
riage). These common law rules were designed to protect male rights by requiring
property and status to be conveyed solely through legitimate inheritance; they pre-
vented out-of-wedlock children from having any claims to a man's inheritance ab-
sent legitimation. See id. at 1683-84 ("By setting the default rules concerning status
transmission and custodial responsibility as it did, the coverture regime allowed
men to remain sexually active outside of marriage and to bear virtually none of the
material burdens .... ).
37. This term is not used pejoratively, but rather in its historical context.
38. See Hogan v. Hogan, 44 S.W. 953, 954 (Ky. 1898) (disallowing out-of-wed-
lock child from inheriting property or status from his unwed mother); In re Cady's
[Vol. 47: p. 707
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American common law's adoption of this doctrine, however, recognized
"the mother of a bastard as its natural guardian, and as such ... imposed
upon her the duty of its maintenance, and [gave] her a right to its custody,
and to its services."39 In fact, early American common law established
that, without a statutory duty, an unwed father had no legal obligation to
support his non-legitimated out-of-wedlock child. 40
Early U.S. citizenship laws retained these gender-biased customs. 4 1
For example, the first statute conferring citizenship to foreign-born chil-
dren provided that only married citizen fathers could convey citizenship to
their foreign-born marital children. 42 Until the Nationality Act of 1940,
Estate, 12 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (same); Friesner v. Symonds, 20
A. 257, 259 (NJ. Prerog. Ct. 1890) (noting that mother of out-of-wedlock child is
its natural guardian, and thus must support child); State v. Tieman, 73 P. 375, 376
(Wash. 1903) (explaining that in absence of statute, putative father has no legal
obligation to support his illegitimate child); see also Brief of Amici Curiae National
Women's Law Center at 15, Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071)
(citing and discussing Friesner).
39. Friesner, 20 A. at 259; see Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law
Center at 15, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (quoting same); Collins, supra note 12, at 1682-
83 (discussing role of coverture and parental responsibility in American history).
40. See, e.g., Glidden v. Nelson, 15 Ill. App. 297, 300 (11. App. Ct. 1884) (rul-
ing on bastardy proceeding); Beckett v. State ex rel. Rothert, 30 N.E. 536, 537 (Ind.
App. 1892) (same); Tieman, 73 P. at 376 (same); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
National Women's Law Center at 15-16, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing Glidden and
Beckett as support); Collins, supra note 12, at 1683 n.67 (noting statutory departures
from American common law).
41. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 16, Nguyen
(No. 99-2071) (noting that early statutes allowed citizenship to be conveyed only by
married citizen fathers); Collins, supra note 12, at 1685 (explaining that coverture
was automatically implicated in U.S. jus sanguinis citizenship). In 1907, Congress
enacted a statute that was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court whereby
women citizens automatically relinquished their U.S. citizenship upon marriage to
alien men. See Act of Mar. 2, 1907, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228 ("[A]ny American
woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband."); Mac-
kenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915) ("[O]ur construction of the legislation
will make every act, though lawful, as marriage, of course, is, a renunciation of
citizenship.").
42. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (providing for citizenship
for foreign-born children provided that this right "shall not descend to persons
whose fathers have never been resident in United States"); see also Miller v. Al-
bright, 523 U.S. 420, 461 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that father's
residency requirement indicates congressional intent to acquire citizenship only
through father). This was in concert with English law at that time. See 2 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERiCAN LAw 50-51 (12th ed. 1873) ("[T]o entitle a
child born abroad to the rights of an English natural born subject, the father must
be an English subject; and if the father be an alien, the child cannot inherit to the
mother, though she was born under the King's allegiance."). Additionally, women
risked their own U.S. citizenship when they married foreigners. See Miller, 523 U.S.
at 463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding women's inability to convey their citizen-
ship was one of many gender-based distinctions employed by our immigration
laws). In 1934, married citizen mothers were granted the ability to convey citizen-
ship to their children. See Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797 (allowing
both married citizen parents to convey citizenship).
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citizenship laws were silent on the issue of citizenship for foreign-born out-
of-wedlock children. 43 Despite this official silence, the State Department
permitted foreign-born out-of-wedlock children to acquire citizenship
through their citizen mothers on the basis that the unwed mother "stands
in the place of the father."44 Consistent with coverture principles, unwed
citizen fathers, however, could not convey citizenship to their foreign-born
out-of-wedlock children absent legitimation.
4 5
2. Nationality Act of 1940
First codified in 1940, the discriminatory gender classifications of sec-
tion 1409 have their roots in the doctrine of coverture. The Nationality
Act of 1940 (1940 Act) comprehensively codified all existing citizenship,
immigration and naturalization laws. 4 6 The legislative history for the 1940
43. Initially, Congress did not differentiate between foreign-born marital chil-
dren and foreign-born out-of-wedlock children. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 462 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (noting that only citizen fathers could convey citizenship to
their marital and legitimated out-of-wedlock children). In 1934, Congress permit-
ted foreign-born children to acquire citizenship from either a citizen mother or
father. See Act of May 24, 1934, § 1 (terminating discrimination against citizen
mothers of children born abroad). In 1940, Congress repealed its earlier provision
on conveying citizenship to foreign-born children, and in its place enacted new
provisions that distinguished between foreign-born marital children and foreign-
born out-of-wedlock children. See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201-205, 54
Stat. 1138-40; Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 17 n.15,
Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (discussing legislative development of § 1409); Miller, 523
U.S. at 466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that 1940 Act allowed foreign-born
marital children to gain citizenship from either parent equally, but "established a
different regime for children born out of wedlock, one that disadvantaged United
States citizen fathers and their children"); Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's
Law Center at 17 n.15, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
44. See HOUSE COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, 76TH CONG., RE-
PORT PROPOSING A REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, PART ONE: PROPOSED CODE WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENTS 18
(Comm. Print 1939); see also Miller, 523 U.S. at 463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that Attorney General ultimately rejected State Department's reasoning as it
was incompatible with § 1993, which allowed conveyance of citizenship to children
born out-of-wedlock if legitimated by father). The Nationality Act of 1940 settled
the dispute and allowed unwed mothers to convey citizenship to their children
born out-of-wedlock. See Nationality Act §§ 201-205.
45. See To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States into a Compre-
hensive Nationality Code: Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the House Comm. on Immigration
and Naturalization, 76th Cong. 431 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 Hearings] (requiring
father to legitimate paternity, but finding mother is bound to support child with-
out any similar affirmative, legally identifiable steps).
46. See Nationality Act §§ 201-205 (establishing existing citizenship, immigra-
tion and naturalization laws; H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 27 (1952) ("The 1940 act
combined all substantive and procedural requirements for naturalization."); Brief
of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 17, Nguyen 121 S. Ct. 2053 (ex-
plaining that President Roosevelt selected members from Department of State, De-
partment of Labor and Attorney General's Office "'to study the existing laws
governing nationality, and to prepare a draft code embodying such changes and
additions as might seem desirable, together with a report explaining the issues."')
(quoting 1940 Hearings, supra note 45, at 235). The members of these depart-
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Act does not verify that the legitimation requirement was based on a per-
ceived need to prove biological parenthood and/or foster ties between the
child, the parent and the United States.4 7 Rather, the legislative history
reveals that the disparate treatment found in the present-day section 1409
harmonized the principles of coverture which assigned unwed mothers
and fathers different care-taking responsibilities for their out-of-wedlock
children. 48
Consequently, while married citizen parents were equally able to con-
vey citizenship to their foreign-born marital children, the 1940 Act re-
quired unwed citizen fathers to first legitimate paternity to convey
citizenship to their foreign-born out-of-wedlock children. 49 The 1940 Act
only allowed citizenship to pass from an unwed mother to her child when
paternity was not legitimated. 50 Distinguishing between marital and out-
of-wedlock children in this manner reinforced the gender schemas stem-
ming from the assignment of rights and responsibilities for out-of-wedlock
ments presented a proposal of the 1940 Act (1940 proposal) to the President, who
in turn conveyed it to Congress on June 13, 1938. See Brief of Amici Curiae Na-
tional Women's Law Center at 18 n.17, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
47. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1692 (using history to show that gender-based
regulation of U.S. citizenship was not grounded in mother's unique biological role
in childbirth).
48. For a further discussion on the principles of coverture, see supra notes 34-
45 and accompanying text. The 1940 proposal justified allowing unwed citizen
mothers to convey citizenship to their foreign-born out-of-wedlock children by
stating:
[I]t may be said that the Department of State has, at least since 1912,
uniformly held that an illegitimate child born abroad of an American
mother acquires at birth the nationality of the mother, in the absence of
legitimation or adjudication establishing the paternity of the child. This
ruling is based ... on the ground that the mother in such a case stands in
the place of the father.... [U] nder American law the mother "has a right
to the custody and control of such a child as against the putative father,
and is bound to maintain it as its natural guardian." This rule seems to
be in accord with the old Roman law and with the laws of Spain and
France.
1940 Hearings, supra note 45, at 431; see Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's
Law Center at 18, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing same). Concerns regarding proof
of biological parenthood and/or fostering ties between the foreign-born out-of-
wedlock child and the United States were raised with respect to other provisions
encompassed by the 1940 Act. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law
Center at 23-24, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (noting that 1940 Act imposed residency
requirements as condition of retaining citizenship in order to address concerns
over fostering ties).
49. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 466 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(explaining that legitimated out-of-wedlock children acquired citizenship gener-
ally under local law of place of birth). In addition to requiring legitimation during
the child's minority, the 1940 Act also required a five-year residency requirement
within the United States before the child reached the age of twenty one. See id.
50. See id. (explaining that, absent legitimation, out-of-wedlock children could
acquire citizenship from unwed mother provided that she was U.S. citizen at time
of child's birth and had previously resided in United States).
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children under the doctrine of coverture.5 1
3. 1986 Amendments to Section 1409(a)
The essence of section 1409 (a) has remained largely unchanged since
the adoption of the 1940 Act. 52 In 1986, Congress merely made procedu-
ral amendments to the way unwed fathers could convey citizenship to their
foreign-born out-of-wedlock children. 53 Nevertheless, Congress preserved
51. For a discussion on the assignment of rights and responsibilities, see supra
notes 34-45 and accompanying text. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1693 (explaining
that women's responsibility for out-of-wedlock children "did not simply derive
from social custom: Women had (and continue to have) a legal duty to care for
children born out of wedlock, while men did (and do) not"). To date, even
though state laws have abandoned these gendered principles in their child custody
laws, federal citizenship laws have not. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 25-501 (2000)
(finding noncustodial parents now have equal responsibilities to provide child sup-
port); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3900 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-84 (1995);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 501 (1999) (same); FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13 (1997) (same);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208 § 28 (1998) (same); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (Mc-
Kinney 1999) (same); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (Vernon 1996) (same); see
also Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 19, Nguyen (No. 99-
2071) (citing same).
52. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 467 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that subse-
quent legislation retained gender lines drawn in 1940 Act); Brief of Amici Curiae
National Women's Law Center at 20, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (same).
53. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 467-68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (permitting legiti-
mation of paternity to be substituted by written acknowledgement of financial re-
sponsibilities under oath or adjudication of paternity by court order). In 1986,
Congress amended the language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
primarily to streamline administration of § 1409 and to "conform [it] with opin-
ions of the United States Supreme Court in nationality cases." Administration of the
Immigration and Nationality Laws: Hearings on H.R. 4823, H.R. 4444, and H.R. 2184
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 144 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Hearings] (statement of Joan
Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs) (discussing H.R. 4444).
Assistant Secretary Clark's written statement contains the only substantive dis-
cussion about why unwed fathers are required to establish a biological, financial
and legal relationship with their out-of-wedlock children. See Brief of Amici Curiae
National Women's Law Center at 20-21, Nguyen (No. 99-2071). Assistant Secretary
of State for Consular Affairs, Joan Clark, explained the need for the 1986
amendments:
[The purpose of the proposed amendment is] to permit an illegitimate
child of an American citizen father to acquire U.S. citizenship based on
the father's formal written acknowledgment of paternity, or a court adju-
dication of paternity. This proposal would simplify and facilitate determi-
nations of acquisition of citizenship by children born out of wedlock, to
an American citizen father, by eliminating the necessity of determining
the father's residence or domicile and establishing satisfaction of the le-
gitimation provisions of the jurisdiction. To deter fraudulent claims,
however, the fact that a blood relationship exists between the U.S. citizen
father and the child would have to be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. Moreover the child's father, if living, must agree to provide for
the child's financial support. The 'purpose of this clause is to facilitate
the enforcement of a child support order and, thus, lessen the chance
that the child could become a financial burden to the states.
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the disparate rules for unwed mothers and fathers as they had existed
under the common law and the 1940 Act.
54
The primary purpose of the 1986 amendments was to simplify the
legitimation requirement that previously required knowledge of the com-
plex rules for legitimation in differentjurisdictions. 55 Under the State De-
partment's proposal, which became section 1409(a) (4), an unwed father
could either formally acknowledge the minor's paternity in writing or ad-
judicate paternity by court order in place of legitimation. 56 The Depart-
ment further proposed requiring unwed fathers to agree in writing to
financially support their out-of-wedlock children .so that these children
would not become a financial burden on the states.57 This proposal be-
came section 1409(a) (3).58 Finally, to deter fraudulent claims, the De-
partment proposed an additional requirement that was codified into
section 1409(a) (1).59 Under section 1409(a) (1), a biological father-child
relationship must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
60
Given the additional requirement of proving a biological relationship
under section 1409(a) (1), the legislative history is silent as to what further
purpose is served by requiring unwed fathers, but not unwed mothers, to
also legitimate paternity. Moreover, the development of section
1409 (a) (4) demonstrates an absence of any interest by the State Depart-
ment or Congress in fostering ties between foreign-born out-of-wedlock
children and their citizen fathers, and in turn, the United States. 61 What
the legislative history does reveal is that the gendered stratification of sec-
1986 Hearings, supra, at 150. The Judiciary Committee recommended enactment
of the State Department's proposed changes to the present-day § 1409 without
amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 99-916, at 1, 3, 12-13 (1986) (submitting bill con-
taining 1986 amendments to Congress); see also Brief of Amici Curiae National
Women's Law Center at 21-22, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (explaining that Assistant
Secretary Clark's statement was incorporated into record).
54. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 22, Nguyen
(No. 99-2071) (concluding that Congress agreed to maintain basic gender-based
framework).
55. See 1986 Hearings, supra note 53, at 150 (providing Assistant Secretary
Clark's explanation on purpose of 1986 amendments).
56. See id. (providing alternate options to satisfy requirement of legitimiza-
tion); Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 22, Nguyen (No. 99-
2071) (same).
57. See 1986 Hearings, supra note 53, at 150 (adding additional requirement to
grant citizenship to foreign-born out-of-wedlock children of citizen fathers); Brief
of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 22, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (dis-
cussing additional requirement).
58. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3) (1994).
59. See 1986 Hearings, supra note 53, at 150 (providing Assistant Secretary
Clark's explanation on purpose of 1986 amendments); Brief of Amici Curiae Na-
tional Women's Law Center at 22, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (same).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (a) (1) (requiring unwed father to establish biological
relationship in order to convey citizenship to out-of-wedlock child).
61. For a further discussion of legislative intent, see supra notes 52-60 and
accompanying text.
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tion 1409 is rooted in the common law's outmoded stereotypes. 62
C. Equal Protection
No provision of the U.S. Constitution explicitly directs the federal
government to provide equal protection to all persons under the law.63
The Supreme Court, however, has expanded application of the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee to the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment's on the basis that those similarly situated
should be treated alike. 64 Thus, for equal protection challenges to federal
laws that classify on the basis of sex, such as section 1409, courts must
decide if the governmental interest legitimately justifies the line-drawing
at issue.6
5
1. Levels of Judicial Review
Depending upon the classification targeted by the contested federal
law, a court will employ one of three levels of equal protection review. 66
The most demanding review, strict scrutiny, is applied when the classifica-
tion affects a fundamental right or distinguishes on the basis of race. 67
Strict scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate that the federal
law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.68 Rational
basis, on the other hand, minimally requires that the means adopted by
the federal law be rationally related to a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. 69 Between these two extremes is intermediate scrutiny. This re-
62. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 22-23, Nguyen
(No. 99-2071) (critiquing origins of § 1409).
63. See, e.g., Nikki Ahrenholz, Comment, Miller v. Albright: Continuing to Dis-
criminate on the Basis of Gender and Illegitimacy, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 281, 282-89
(1998) (discussing equal protection jurisprudence comprehensively).
64. See id. at 282 n.10 (discussing equal protection under Fifth Amendment).
65. See id. at 282 (identifying need for appropriate government purpose).
66. See id. (explaining levels of scrutiny).
67. See id. (discussing levels of equal protection scrutiny).
68. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that
all racial classifications, including benign ones, are subject to strict scrutiny);
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to classifications
based on alienage unless political function exception applies); Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down affirma-
tive action plan for medical school admission where race-based quotas were uti-
lized); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to facially-
neutral, race-based statutory classification banning interracial marriages); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (utilizing strict scrutiny to strike down segrega-
tion in schools); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
under strict scrutiny legal restrictions that curtailed civil rights ofJapanese Ameri-
cans by placing them in detention camps).
69. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (holding that al-
though homosexuality is not fundamental right, it is deserving of equal protection
under rational basis review); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 446 (1985) (holding mental retardation is not quasi-suspect classification re-
quiring intermediate scrutiny, but looking closely at state interest under rational
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quires the classification to be substantially related to achieving the
important governmental objectives. 70
Presently, the Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny to classifi-
cations based upon sex. 7 1 Under this standard, those seeking to defend
the statutory classification must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive
justification that is substantially related to achieving the genuine and im-
portant governmental interest. 72 Namely, the Court has specified that the
justifications sustaining the discriminatory classification "must be genuine,
not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." 73 Moreo-
ver, the justifications cannot "rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females," 74 even
if they enjoy empirical support.75
basis review); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977) (establishing factors to determine if facially-neutral statute with discrimina-
tory effect has intent to discriminate, thus warranting scrutiny higher than rational
basis); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (applying rational basis re-
view to facially neutral statutes that allegedly have discriminatory impact on race
absent showing of intent to discriminate); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
quez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (applying rational basis review because wealth is not
suspect classification).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,529 (1996) (requiring "an
exceedingly persuasive" governmental justification to uphold gender-based classifi-
cation); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that although education is not
fundamental right, it is deserving of intermediate scrutiny if statute imposes abso-
lute ban on education of children of illegal aliens); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-
76 (1978) (applying intermediate scrutiny to statutory classification based on ille-
gitimacy where statute required illegitimate children to receive formal order of
paternity during father's lifetime in order to inherit from father); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (adopting intermediate scrutiny as standard of review for
gender-based classification that prohibited sale of near-beer to males under twenty-
one years of age and women under eighteen years of age); Fronterio v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to gender-based classifica-
tion that required military women to show that their husbands are actually
dependents but did not require military men to make any such showing); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (applying intermediate scrutiny to strike down
statute that gave preference to male estate administrators over female
administrators).
71. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2059 (2001) (requiring gender-based
classifications to possess important governmental interests that are substantially re-
lated to achieving those objectives in order to withstand equal protection scrutiny);
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 516 (requiring "exceedingly persuasive" governmental interest
for gender-based classifications to survive equal protection scrutiny).
72. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 516 (arguing, possibly, for higher showing under
intermediate scrutiny).
73. Id. at 533.
74. Id.
75. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citingJ.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
199 (1976), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975), for proposi-
tion that empirical support of stereotypes does not validate gender-based
classifications).
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2. Impact of Equal Protection Jurisprudence on Immigration Law
To date, immigration jurisprudence exemplifies one of the few in-
stances where Congress, with the Court's approval, has succeeded in evad-
ing the constitutional precept of equality for all persons under the law.
76
The principles of immigration law are chiefly based upon the Equal Pro-
tection Clause despite the Constitution's failure to mention immigration
or define citizenship. 77 In 1886, the Court clarified that the phrase "any
person" in the Due Process Clause protected aliens and citizens alike.
78
Therefore, aliens and citizens are deserving of equal protection under the
law. The plenary power doctrine, however, limits the equal protection
guarantee by giving Congress nearly exclusive power to decide immigra-
tion and naturalization claims. 79 Based on judicial deference to this
power, the Supreme Court has limited its review to what appears to be
rational basis scrutiny in immigration and nationality cases employing sex-
based classifications.8 0
The first clarification of the plenary power doctrine within the equal
protection context was in Fiallo v. Bell.8 1 The provision at issue in Fiallo
denied the out-of-wedlock children of American fathers the same prefer-
ential status for obtaining immigration visas afforded to the similarly-situ-
ated children of American mothers.8 2 The Fiallo Court faced an equal
protection challenge to an immigration statute (implicating rational basis
review pursuant to Congress' plenary power) that employed a sex-based
76. See Debra L. Satinoff, Comment, Sex-Based Discrimination in U.S. Immigra-
tion Law: The High Court's Lost Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between What We Say and
What We Do, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1353, 1354 (1998) (pointing to Court's reluctance to
interfere in matters implicating Congress' plenary power). Two provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act still differentiate on the basis of gender. See, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b) (1) (D) (1994) (differentiating between mothers and fathers for
purpose of obtaining special immigration visas for their illegitimate foreign-born
children); 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994) (differentiating between mothers and fathers for
purpose of conveying U.S. citizenship to their illegitimate foreign-born children).
77. See Ahrenholz, supra note 63, at 288 (discussing history of U.S. immigra-
tion and nationality laws).
78. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens."); see
also H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 25-26 (1952) (discussing implication of Court's opin-
ion in Yick Wo on citizenship for foreign-born children).
79. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (recognizing that Congress'
power to exclude or expel aliens is well established); accord Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 769-70; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); see also Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 456 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Ahrenholz,
supra note 63, at 288 (same).
80. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795 (deferring to plenary power in context of sex-
based immigration statute).
81. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
82. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788-92 (holding that because Congress' power to
expel or exclude aliens is largely immune from judicial review, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 101(b) (1) (D) and 1101 (b) (2), do not warrant more searching judicial scru-
tiny); see also Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1358-59 (discussing same).
[Vol. 47: p. 707
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol47/iss3/7
COMMENT
classification (warranting intermediate scrutiny)."
The Fiallo Court reviewed the statute as an immigration law, not as
one employing a sex-based classification.8 4 Deferring to Congress' plenary
power, the Court required the government to show a "facially legitimate
and bona fide reason" for the sex-based classification to survive judicial
scrutiny.8 5 Several lower courts have equated this test with rational basis
review. 86 A few courts have read this standard as being even less stringent
than rational basis.8 7
In its deference to the Court, the Fiallo Court declined to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny to the sex-based immigration law.88 The Court ignored
its own precedent set one year earlier, in Craig v. Boren,8 9 where the Court
held that intermediate scrutiny applied to sex-based classifications chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause.9 0 Unlike classifications war-
ranting rational basis review, sex-based classifications carry a "strong
presumption" of invalidity under intermediate scrutiny.9 1 Accordingly, an
equal protection challenge to a sex-based classification in a non-immigra-
tion context is likely to prevail over one implicated in immigration law.9 2
III. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO SECTION 1409 (A) (4)
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed equal protection challenges
to section 1409(a) (4).93 In both cases the Court fashioned legitimate gov-
83. See Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1359 (providing overview of federal gender-
based immigration cases subject to equal protection challenges and discussing
Fiallo).
84. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (recognizing at outset Court's limited judicial
power over immigration law).
85. Id. at 794; see Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1359 n.29 (explaining that Court
formally adopted standard in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
86. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding "facially
legitimate and bona fide reason" test equivalent to rational basis review); Azizi v.
Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); see also Satinoff, supra
note 76, at 1359 (same).
87. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that
congressional action must be "so baseless" as to be invalid); Satinoff, supra note 76,
at 1359 n.32 (pointing to language in Fiallo for proposition that Fiallo also finds its
standard as easier to meet than rational basis review) (citation omitted).
88. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794 ("[T]his Court has resolved similar challenges to
immigration legislation ... and has rejected the suggestion that more searching
judicial scrutiny is required."); see also Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1360 (same).
89. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
90. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98 (discussing gender classifications and whether
they serve important governmental objectives); see also Satinoff, supra note 76, at
1360 (discussing same).
91. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (citing J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994)); see also Satinoff, supra note 76, at
1360 n.37 (noting same).
92. See Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1360-61 (noting tension caused by plenary
power between immigration and sex-based equal protection challenges).
93. Both Miller and Nguyen raised the question of whether differential treat-
ment of mothers and fathers under federal citizenship law violated the equal pro-
2002]
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ernmental interests premised upon biological determinism to sustain the
gender-based classifications.9 4 When the issue was first presented, in Miller
v. Albright,95 the plurality explained that "the biological differences be-
tween single men and single women" justify Congress' concern for a class
of potential citizens born abroad and out-of-wedlock to alien mothers and
to American men who are unaware of their children's existence. 96 Most
recently, in a five-to-four decision,9 7 the Court in Nguyen v. INS 98 similarly
used the differences between women and men "in relation to the birth
process" to uphold the sex-based statutory classification under intermedi-
ate scrutiny.99 Consequently, in each of these cases, the Court fractured
tection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. See generally Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct.
2053 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). The petitioners in both cases
argued that requiring heightened statutory hurdles for American fathers to convey
citizenship solely because they are the male parent sanctioned outmoded gender
stereotypes. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2063 (dismissing petitioner's argument);
Miller, 523 U.S. at 442-45 (dismissing notion that § 1409 is based on gender stereo-
types, such as American fathers are breadwinners who play no role in child rearing
duties and unwed mothers will have more emotional connection to out-of-wedlock
children than unwed fathers).
94. For a further discussion, see infra notes 102-36 and accompanying text.
95. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
96. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 439, 445 (explaining that differential 'egulation is
justified because U.S. servicemen may return to United States at end of their tour
of duty without being aware of their children's existence due to nine-month gesta-
tion period).
97. The line up of the Nguyen Court was very similar to that in Miller, with
Justice O'Connor as the swing vote. Compare Miller, 523 U.S. at 420-23, with Nguyen,
121 S. Ct. at 2057 (showing that two out of nine justices changed positions). The
Miller plurality opinion was written by Justice Stevens, with whom Chief Justice
Rehnquistjoined. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 423. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy con-
curred primarily because the citizen father was not a co-petitioner. See id. at 422.
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred because they felt petitioner's injury was not
redressable. See id. at 422-23. The Nguyen majority, consisting of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Scalia and Thomas, upheld the statute
under intermediate scrutiny. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057. Justices Scalia and
Thomas again concurred because they found only Congress was able to confer jus
sanguinis citizenship. See id. at 2066. Because Nguyen did not suffer the same
standing issues of Miller, O'Connor was required to evaluate the statute in light of
the intermediate equal protection jurisprudence. Consequently, the Nguyen dis-
sent consisted of Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. See id. at 2057.
In sum, Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas found § 1409 (a) (4) survives under
mid-tier review, whereasJustice O'Connor found the level of equal protection scru-
tiny fatal to the provision.
Comparing the language used by Stevens' plurality opinion in Millerwith Ken-
nedy's majority opinion in Nguyen reveals that it was merely semantics that com-
pelled the 5-4 decision; the substantive "legitimate" governmental interests
remained unchanged between the two opinions. Justice Kennedy's opinion
merely refrains from characterizing the conferral of automatic citizenship as a "re-
ward" for the mother deciding against abortion. Cf Miller, 523 U.S. at 433-34 (stat-
ing that § 1409(c) rewards mothers for giving birth).
98. 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
99. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2062, 2066 (finding that ease of travel and in-
creased willingness of Americans to travel abroad has produced even more sub-
stantial grounds to justify statutory distinction).
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along the antediluvian lines dividing sex-based equal protection law and
feminist legal theory-disagreeing as to what extent inherent biological
differences justify sex-based differential treatment of parents. 10 0 Further-
more, in each subsequent instance, the Court avoided resolving the
twenty-five year old Fiallo struggle between immigration law and gender-
based equal protection jurisprudence. 10 1
A. Miller v. Albright
The petitioner in Miller was an out-of-wedlock Philippine-born daugh-
ter of a former American soldier.10 2 Because her mother raised her in the
Philippines, her unwed citizen father was unaware of her existence until
after her twenty-first birthday. 10 3 Consequently, when she applied for U.S.
citizenship, the State Department denied her petition as her father had
failed to legitimate her before the age mandated by the Immigration and
Nationality Act.' 0 4 After a change of venue, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed her suit because the peti-
tioner (without her father as co-petitioner) lacked standing. 10 5 Then, af-
ter the Fiallo decision, 10 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
100. Compare id. at 2060-66 (justifying differential treatment of mothers and
fathers based on biology), and Miller, 523 U.S. at 434-41 (same), with Nguyen, 121 S.
Ct. at 2075-77 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) ("Section 1409(a) (4) is thus paradigmatic
of a historic regime that left women with responsibility and freed men from re-
sponsibility, for nonmarital children."), and Miller, 523 U.S. at 460-71 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (holding that United States' historical ill-treatment of foreign-born
children calls for skeptical examination of government's claimed interest in gen-
der line-drawing); see also Collins, supra note 12, at 1671 n.8 (discussing Nguyen and
Miller).
101. Each time, the Court explicitly failed to say what impact Fiallo had on the
outcome of an equal protection challenge to this gendered immigration statute.
Cf Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059 (declining to address Fiallo because § 1409 survives
under intermediate scrutiny). For a further discussion of the citizen versus alien
debate created by Fiallo, see Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1378-84 (arguing that, in
Miller, if petitioner's father had been deceased and Court had granted petitioner
third-party standing, § 1409(a)(4) would not have been upheld; "[t]he courts
seemingly have allowed a procedural technicality to overshadow the substantive
constitutional issue of equality between the sexes").
102. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 424-25 (noting facts).
103. See id. at 425 (stating facts).
104. See id. (noting that unwed father did not acknowledge paternity until
after petitioner reached age of majority).
105. See id. at 426-27 (noting procedural posture). After the State Depart-
ment rejected her application, the petitioner and her citizen father filed an
amended complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, seeking a judgment declaring her a citizen of the United States. See id. at
426. The district court dismissed the complaint, however, as the father lacked
standing and transferred the case to the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. See id. at 427. The District Court for the District of Columbia then dismissed
her suit for lack of standing because she failed to demonstrate that the court had
the power to redress her injury by granting her citizenship. See id.
106. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding
Fiallo applicable because Fiallo involved equal protection challenge to immigration
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District of Columbia found that, while she had standing, section 1409 was
"entirely reasonable" given that "[a] mother is far less likely to ignore the
child she carried in her womb," while a putative father "'is very often to-
tally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother."107
In deciding on the issue of equal protection, the Miller Court never
reached a majority. 10 8 Instead, a plurality found that section 1409(a) (4)'s
additional requirement that unmarried U.S. fathers, but not similarly-situ-
ated mothers, legitimate parentage did not violate any equal protection
guarantees. 10 9 Because the citizen father was not a co-petitioner, fourjus-
tices, in two different opinions, found the governmental interests suffi-
cient to uphold the disparate provision. 110 In a second concurrence, two
more justices found that the petitioner's injury was unredressable as only
Congress had the power to confer jus sanguinis citizenship. 1 1 In sum,
because the Miller Court was so splintered, it could not conclusively resolve
the question of whether the sex-based classification of section 1409(a) (4)
violated the equal protection guarantee. 112
statute that denied same preferential immigration status to foreign-born illegiti-
mate children of U.S. fathers).
107. Id. at 1472 (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 n.7 (1979)); see
Satinoff, supra note 76, at 1363 (citing same). Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that this
immigration provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the
government had a "legitimate and bona fide reason" for the gender-based classifi-
cation. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472 (upholding application of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)).
108. For a further discussion on the plurality and concurring opinions in
Miller, see infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
109. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 433-45 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (finding that
statute served important governmental interests).
110. See id. at 440 (StevensJ., plurality opinion) (finding means employed by
§ 1409(a) (4) to be well-tailored to serving important governmental interests); see
also id. at 451-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that § 1409(a) (4) passes ra-
tional basis scrutiny). In the plurality opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, held that while petitioner had standing, without her father as
co-petitioner to invoke federal jurisdiction, § 1409(a) (4)'s requirement is emi-
nently reasonable. See id. at 433-45 (stating basis for holding). In the concurrence,
joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor found petitioner lacked standing to
raise a gender-based equal protection claim triggering intermediate scrutiny. See
id. at 445-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that this provision is sustaina-
ble under rational basis review). Rather, "she can only argue that § 1409 irration-
ally discriminates between illegitimate children of citizen fathers and citizen
mothers." Id. at 451.
111. See id. at 452-59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that federal court lacks
power to grant declaratory judgment). Because the plenary power doctrine se-
verely limits the exercise of judicial power over immigration and naturalization
issues, Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, concurred in dismissing
petitioner's complaint on the grounds that her injury was not redressable. See id.
(" 'Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a funda-
mental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments
largely immune from judicial control."') (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977)).
112. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2058 (2001) ("The constitutionality of
the distinction between unwed fathers and mothers was argued in Miller, but a
majority of the Court did not resolve the issue."). While the Miller Court did not
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The Miller plurality found that a strong governmental interest justified
the sex-based distinction for conferral of citizenship.' 1 3 According to the
plurality, a mother should be bestowed a "reward" for her decision to
forgo an abortion. 114 In contrast, the plurality found that because an
American father does not have to "participate in the decision to give birth"
and is not burdened with having to raise the child, he should not be simi-
larly rewarded. 1" 5 For this reason, the plurality held that section
1409(a) (4) operates as the "rough equivalent" for proving biological pa-
ternity-the first legitimate governmental interest.
1 16
Then, the Miller plurality turned to the second governmental inter-
est-fostering ties between the child and the father, and, in turn, the
United States. 117 In the context of explaining the importance of this in-
terest, the plurality turned to the sexual irresponsibility of men. 118 The
plurality explained that because of the nine-month gestation period, Con-
gress was rightfully concerned that the American servicemen stationed
abroad could have unknowingly fathered out-of-wedlock children and,
thus, unknowingly conveyed U.S. citizenship to persons that had no ties to
the country. 1 9 For the Miller plurality, it was reasonable to condition the
award of citizenship on legitimation; "an act that demonstrates, at a mini-
conclusively resolve the issue, six justices did find it perfectly acceptable to con-
struct an exclusive and discriminatory nation by barring the entry of the illegiti-
mate children of American fathers unless they are first legitimated. See Augustine-
Adams, supra note 3, at 100-01 (discussing breakdown of Miller plurality).
113. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 436-38 (discussing important governmental
interests).
114. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 433 (justifying disparate regulation on basis of bio-
logical determinism).
If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry the
pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion-an alternative
that is available by law to many, and in reality to most, women around the
world. She must then actually give birth to the child. Section 1409(c)
rewards that choice and that labor by conferring citizenship on her child.
Id. at 433-34.
115. See id. at 434-35 (justifying disparate regulation on basis of biological
determinism).
If the citizen is the unmarried male, he need not participate in the deci-
sion to give birth rather than to choose an abortion; he need not be pre-
sent at the birth; and for at least 17 years thereafter he need not provide
any parental support, either moral or financial, to either the mother or
the child, in order to preserve his right to confer citizenship on the child
pursuant to § 1409(a).... It seems obvious that the burdens imposed on
the female citizen are more severe than those imposed on the male citi-
zen by § 1409(a) (4), the only provision at issue in this case.
Id. at 434.
116. See id. at 436 (dismissing as hollow gender-neutral alternative of requir-
ing formal documentation of paternity within thirty days irrespective of sex).
117. See id. at 438-41 (explaining holding).
118. See id. (stating holding).
119. See id. at 438-39 (noting that when petitioner was born in 1970, 683,000
military servicemen were stationed abroad in Far East and women comprised only
one percent of all U.S. servicemen in armed forces).
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mum, the possibility that those who become citizens will develop ties with
this country-a requirement that performs a meaningful purpose for citizen
fathers but normally would be superfluous for citizen mothers."120
B. Nguyen v. INS
Three years after Miller, the Court got a second chance to resolve the
equal protection issue in Nguyen. 12 ' The Nguyen case was brought by a
Vietnamese-born son and the unwed American father who raised him in
the United States since age six.' 22 Only after the twenty-eight year-old
son, Nguyen, was facing deportation from the United States as a result of a
criminal conviction did his father attempt to convey citizenship. 123 He
established biological paternity through DNA testing and obtained an or-
120. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). The plurality dismissed the notion that
fathers are less likely than mothers to develop ties with their children as a product
of "overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women." See id.
(explaining holding). Rather,Justice Stevens opined that given the vast number of
U.S. servicemen abroad who may not even be aware of the existence of their chil-
dren due to the nine-month gestation interval, Congress was legitimately con-
cerned about conferring U.S. citizenship to these illegitimate children at birth. See
id. The Nguyen Court expressed this same concern in its analysis. See Nguyen v.
INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2061-62 (2001) (noting that in 1999, 252,763 out of 1,385,703
U.S. servicemen were stationed abroad).
121. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057 ("This case presents a question not resolved
by a majority of the Court in a case before us three Terms ago" in Miller). Millers
failure to resolve the constitutionality of differentiating between unwed fathers
and mothers resulted in a circuit split. Compare Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 533-
35 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding § 1409 (a) on equal protection grounds), with Lake
v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 147-50 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001)
(striking down provision), and United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121,
1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated by 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001) (same).
122. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (noting facts). Co-Petitioner Joseph Bou-
lais raised his out-of-wedlock, Vietnamese-born son, Petitioner Tuan Anh Nguyen,
from infancy. See id. at 2057. Because Nguyen claimed U.S. citizenship through
his father, § 1409 imposed additional requirements upon his conferral of citizen-
ship. See id. at 2058-59 (discussing statutory requirements for conferral of jus
sanguinis citizenship). Section 1409 (a) (3), however, was inapplicable to Nguyen as
the 1986 amendment added this provision after Nguyen's birth, thus allowing him
to opt out of satisfying this requirement. See id. at 2059 (recognizing that Nguyen
falls within transitional rule, allowing him to elect application of pre-1986 version
which contained no parallel to § 1409(a) (3)). Consequently, in order for Nguyen
to gain jus sanguinis citizenship, § 1409(a) (4) had to be satisfied. See id. (noting
facts). Mr. Boulais did formally acknowledge paternity, but not before Nguyen was
in his twenties. See id. at 2057.
123. See id. (stating facts). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) authorizes deporta-
tion by INS of an alien who has been convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude, as well as one aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a) (2) (A) (ii) and
(iii) (1994 ed., Supp. IV).
In 1992, Nguyen pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a child and was
sentenced to eight years in prison on each count. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057
(noting facts). Although in the present case Nguyen argued that he was a U.S.
citizen at the deportation hearing, he testified that he was a Vietnamese citizen.
See id. (noting facts).
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der of parentage from a Texas court.124 Nevertheless, because his son had
already reached the age of majority, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) deemed the son a non-citizen subject to deportation.1 25 Thus, even
though the father raised and supported his son in the United States since
he was six, failure to satisfy section 1409(a) (4) within the time period pre-
scribed barred conferral of citizenship to Nguyen and subjected him to
deportation.126
Both father and son appealed the decision of the BIA ordering
Nguyen's deportation to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.12 7 The Fifth Circuit deemed the son a non-citizen for failure to
satisfy section 1409(a) (4).128 While the father had standing to bring the
equal protection challenge to the statute, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
constitutional challenge to section 1409(a) (4).129 Resolving the standing
issue of Miller, both father and son went before the Supreme Court on
appeal. 130 In holding that section 1409(a) was consistent with the equal
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court contin-
ued to focus on the same "basic biological differences" used by the Miller
plurality as a means to uphold the gender subordination.13 '
The Nguyen Court declared that Congress' decision to require proof
of "a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one" is rooted in the signifi-
cantly different nature of relationships that mothers and fathers have with
124. See id. (noting facts).
125. See id. (noting facts); see also Editorial, Gender Bias in Immigration Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2001, at A14 (reporting on oral arguments heard by United
States Supreme Court).
126. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057 (noting facts).
127. See id. at 2058 ("The father is before the Court in this case; and, as all
agree he has standing to raise the constitutional claim, we now resolve it.").
128. See id. (noting facts).
129. See id. (discussing facts).
130. See id. (setting-forth facts).
131. See id. at 2066 ("To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological
differences-such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father
need not be-risks making the guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so
disserving it."). The Nguyen Court used much of the reasoning put forth in Miller
in its own analysis. For example, both Courts grounded the same purported legiti-
mate justifications in the biology of birth. Compare Miller, 523 U.S. at 436-39 (not-
ing importance of proving biological parent-child relationship and of fostering ties
between child and nation), with Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060-63 (finding two govern-
mental interests: (1) proof of biological paternity, and (2) fostering ties between
parent and child and nation and child). With respect to the first governmental
objective, both Courts dismissed the argument that it is irrational to require legiti-
mation when § 1409(a) (1) already requires proof of paternity by clear and con-
vincing evidence, such as gender-neutral DNA testing. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 438
(finding that neither § 1409(a) (1) mandates DNA test nor does Constitution re-
quire Congress to elect one particular mechanism); accord Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at
2060-61.
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their potential citizen children at birth. 132 Namely, in satisfying the first
governmental interest (proof of biological parenthood), the Court noted
that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated.' 33 While the mother-
child blood relation is uniquely "verifiable from the birth itself," a father-
child blood relation is not.134 Consequently, fathers can avail themselves
to the gender-based options presented by section 1409(a) (4).
Relying on the plurality analysis in Miller, the Nguyen Court reiterated
the same second important governmental interest. 135 Specifically, the
Court articulated that legitimation provides the foreign-born out-of-wed-
lock child and the citizen father with a "demonstrated opportunity orpoten-
tiat' to develop a meaningful relationship comprised of "the real, everyday
ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in
turn, the United States." 13
6
IV. ANALYSIS
The Nguyen Court's narrow upholding of the statute under equal pro-
tection jurisprudence makes a troubling yet powerful statement. 13 7 First,
by upholding section 1409(a)(4) under intermediate scrutiny, the Court
departed from its own sex-based equal protection precedent. 138 Second,
the practical impact of the Court's holding is the reinforcement and man-
agement of gender roles with profound consequences for both citizen par-
ents and their children. 139 Specifically, section 1409(a) maintains the
gender schemas of single women as sexually responsible and the corollary
of single men as sexually irresponsible. 140 Thus, motherhood becomes
132. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060 (declaring explicitly that requirement of
paternal relationship, but not maternal relationship, was warranted by two impor-
tant governmental interests).
133. See id. (explaining that mother's presence at birth proves maternity,
whereas father's presence at birth is not conclusive proof of paternity).
134. See id. (discussing importance of proving existence of biological parent-
child relationship).
In the case of the mother, the relation is verifiable from the birth itself.
The mother's status is documented in most instances by the birth certifi-
cate or hospital records.... In the case of the father, the uncontestable
fact is that he need not be present at the birth. If he is present, further-
more, that circumstance is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood.
Id.
135. See id. at 2061-62 (explaining holding).
136. Id. at 2061 (emphasis added).
137. For a further critique of the Court's analysis in upholding the statute, see
infra notes 138-87 and accompanying text.
138. For a further discussion of the inconsistency under Supreme Court pre-
cedence, see infra notes 141-87 and accompanying text.
139. For a further discussion, see infra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
140. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2062 ("One concern in [requiring legitimation
of paternity to foster ties between citizen father and alien child] has always been
with young people, men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces
in foreign countries."); Miller, 523 U.S. at 438-39 (explaining that facts of Miller
provide ready example of concern that American servicemen will unknowingly fa-
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biologically mandated and fatherhood legally determinative for immigra-
tion purposes. Fundamentally, the Court finds the biological tie is insuffi-
cient to establish fatherhood.
A. Section 1409(a)(4) Does Not Survive Under Intermediate Scrutiny
The Court's blatant departure from its own precedent reveals that sec-
tion 1409's gender-based classification is socially constructed, not biologi-
cally mandated. As discussed previously, section 1409(a) (4)'s legitimation
requirement finds its roots in coverture, a socially-constructed doctrine.1 4'
Instead of looking to these origins, both Nguyen and Miller invented two
post hoc justifications based on biology to support the sex-based oppres-
sion. 142 In both cases, the Supreme Court maintained that legitimation of
paternity was necessary to establish a blood relation between the citizen
father and the out-of-wedlock child.1 43 Furthermore, under the Court's
reasoning, section 1409(a) (4) provides the citizen father with the opportu-
nity to develop a relationship with the out-of-wedlock child, thus allowing
the potential citizen to also develop ties to the United States.144
Contrary to the Court's holding, legislative history sheds no light on
Congress' actual intent in requiring legitimation of paternity. 145 What his-
tory does reveal is that legitimation of paternity was a means by which
unwed fathers voluntarily took responsibility for their out-of-wedlock chil-
dren; in its absence, legitimation acted as a hook by which to burden un-
wed mothers with care-taking responsibilities. 146 In sum, legitimation
supported biased stereotypes about women as care-givers and reinforced
their legal subservience to men. 147 It is well established that the Court
forbids the government from discriminating on the basis of generaliza-
tions about the respective abilities of women and men. 1 48 In ignoring the
true origins of the legitimation requirement, the Court, in essence, sanc-
ther and unknowingly convey citizenship to children born out-of-wedlock who
have no ties to fathers or nation).
141. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060 ("In the case of the mother, the [blood]
relation is verifiable from the birth itself."); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 436-37
(1998) (utilizing same concept).
142. For a further discussion, see infra notes 151-87 and accompanying text.
143. For a further discussion on the legitimacy of proving biological
parenthood as a governmental interest, see infra notes 151-74 and accompanying
text.
144. For a further discussion on the second governmental interest, see infra
notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
145. For a further discussion on the legislative intent of § 1409, see supra
notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
146. For a further discussion on the doctrine of coverture and its role within
the statutory development of § 1409, see supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion on the doctrine of coverture and its role within
the statutory development of § 1409, see supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
148. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (cautioning courts
against adopting gender-based classifications premised upon overbroad
stereotypes).
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tioned such discrimination in its citizenship laws. 149 Furthermore, the two
legislative justifications put forth by the Court belie the requisite suffi-
ciency of fit between the means employed and the purported end. 150
1. First Governmental Interest
With regards to proving biological parenthood, the Miller plurality
and'the Nguyen majority both point to the biology of birth to substantiate
the subordination of parental status. 15 1 Although the Nguyen Court de-
clared assuring biological parenthood to be an important governmental
interest, the Court offered no proof that this was indeed Congress' intent
in enacting section 1409(a)(4) and failed to explain the importance of
this interest.1 5 2 The only validation of this governmental interest comes
from the Miller plurality, which cited to Fiallo for support.1 53 A closer look
at Fiallo reveals, however, an important distinction ignored by both Miller
and Nguyen. Fiallo explicitly states that "it is not the judicial role in [immi-
gration] cases . . . to probe and test the justifications for the legislative
decision."' 54 While that may be true for an equal protection challenge to
an immigration statute (requiring rational basis review), the same does
not hold true here. The Nguyen Court upholds section 1409(a)'s sex-
based classification under heightened equal protection scrutiny.1 55 As
such, a closer examination and testing of the important governmental jus-
tifications are not only warranted, but are mandated by equal protection
jurisprudence.' 56
149. For a further discussion on the origins of the legitimation requirement,
see supra notes 34,62, infra notes 157-165, 174-76 and accompanying text.
150. For a further discussion on the breakdown between the means and the
asserted end, see infra notes 166-72, 177-87 and accompanying text.
151. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (2001) ("In the case of the
mother, the [blood] relation is verifiable from the birth itself."); Miller v. Albright,
523 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1998) (utilizing same concept).
152. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2069 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (hypothesizing
that importance of governmental interest was rooted in preventing fraudulent con-
veyances of citizenship).
153. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 436 (ensuring "reliable proof of a biological rela-
tionship between the potential citizen and its citizen parent is an important gov-
ernmental objective") (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-71 (1977);
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 n.8 (1977)).
154. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.
155. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059 (finding that provision withstands interme-
diate scrutiny). The disparities between the level and type of scrutiny warranted
for an immigration statute as compared with a gender-based statute are so great as
to affect the outcome of an equal protection challenge. For a further discussion,
see supra notes 66-92 and accompanying text. Consequently, by failing to say what
impact Fiallo has on the outcome of a gender-based equal protection challenge to
this immigration statute, the Miller plurality and the Nguyen majority did a great
disservice to future equal protection jurisprudence surrounding immigration law.
156. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (finding inquiry
into actual purposes underlying legislative provision relevant); see also Nguyen, 121
S. Ct. at 2067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (comparing judicial review under inter-
mediate scrutiny with rational basis review). "'[T]he mere recitation of a benign,
[Vol. 47: p. 707
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Looking closely at the first governmental interest invalidates the
Court's claim that legitimation is substantially related to ensuring corrobo-
ration of biological parenthood. 157 Pointing to the scant legislative his-
tory, "[i]t is difficult to see what [legitimation] accomplishes in
furtherance of 'assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists,'
that section 1409 (a) (1) does not achieve on its own."' 5 8 Thus, in addition
to establishing a legal relationship by legitimation, an unwed citizen father
must establish a biological relationship by means of clear and convincing
evidence under section 1409(a)(1). 1 5 9 If corroboration of biological
parenthood is indeed important, then section 1409(a)(1) accomplishes
that legislative purpose, making section 1409(a) (4)'s legitimation require-
ment redundant and superfluous. 160
In fact, legislative history reveals that the legitimation requirement
originated from an adoption of the coverture principles. 16 I As developed
into section 1409(a) (4), the three legitimation options merely simplified
the previously complex legitimation rules. 16 2 Moreover, when the statute
was amended in 1986, corroboration of biological paternity by means of
clear and convincing evidence was added to deter fraudulent claims.
163
The Court legislated post hoc in holding that proof of biological
parenthood is an important and genuine governmental interest substan-
tially related to section 1409(a) (4).164 "Because § 1409(a) (4) adds little to
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any in-
quiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.'" Id. (quoting Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)). For a further discussion on
intermediate scrutiny, see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
157. For a further discussion, see infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
158. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2069 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting insuffi-
ciency of fit between means used and asserted end). When faced with this argu-
ment, both Courts summarily rejected it on- the basis that § 1409 (a) (1) does not
mandate a DNA test or any other genetic testing to establish a blood relationship.
See id. at 2060-61 (noting that Congress is free to "elect one particular mechanism
from among many possible methods of establishing paternity, even if that mecha-
nism arguably might not be the most scientifically advanced method."); Miller, 523
U.S. at 437-38 (explaining that Congress could permit genetic proof of paternity
instead of legitimation in future).
159. For a further discussion on the text of § 1409, see supra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text.
160. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2070 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding it logi-
cal to accept legitimation as means of satisfying § 1409(a) (1)).
161. For a further discussion on the doctrine of coverture, see supra notes 35-
62 and accompanying text.
162. For a further discussion on the 1986 amendments, see supra notes 52-62
and accompanying text.
163. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2070 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Assis-
tant Secretary Clark's statement before Judiciary Committee).
164. But cf Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 435 (1998) (citing 1986 Hearings,
supra note 53, at 150, 155 for proposition that § 1409 (a) (1)'s requirement of estab-
lishing biological parenthood by clear and convincing evidence was "an ancillary
measure, not a replacement for proof of paternity by legitimation"). Assistant Sec-
retary Clark, in her statement to the Judiciary Subcommittee, explained that the
proposed legitimation options found in § 1409(a) (4) eliminated "the necessity of
2002]
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the work that § 1409(a) (1) does on its own, it is difficult to say that
§ 1409(a) (4) 'substantially furthers' an important governmental
interest."165
Even assuming arguendo that proving biological parenthood is a legiti-
mate governmental interest, the use of biology by the Supreme Court fur-
ther belies the fit between the means used and the asserted end.' 66 Miller
and Nguyen both justified legitimation of paternity on the basis that a
mother's relation to the child is uniquely "verifiable from the birth itself,"
but a father's is not.1 67 Both opinions, however, failed to show that such a
relationship is "uniquely verifiable by the INS, [or] that any greater ver-
ifiability warrants a sex-based, rather than a sex-neutral statute."168
Namely, the Court found no fault with the INS accepting documentation
for mothers, but not for fathers, in the form of foreign hospital records or
birth certificates.169 Despite the known unreliability of foreign birth cer-
tificates and hospital records, the same documentation is incontrovertible
proof of biological parenthood for the mother, but not the father. 1 70 Fur-
thermore, the Nguyen majority and Miller plurality both conceded that this
legislative goal could easily be achieved in a sex-neutral manner.1 7 1 Con-
sequently, dictating that unwed fathers prove biological fatherhood (by
determining the father's residence or domicile and establishing satisfaction of the
legitimation provisions of the jurisdiction. To deter fraudulent claims, however,
the fact that a blood, relationship exists between the U.S. citizen father and the
child would have to be shown by clear and convincing evidence." 1986 Hearings,
supra note 53, at 150. As a result, the State Department's proposal added the re-
quirement found in § 1409(a) (1) of establishing a blood relationship by clear and
convincing evidence. See H.R. REP. No. 99-916, at 12-13 (adopting State Depart-
ment's proposal without amendment). This scant legislative history does not ap-
pear to support the proposition that proving biological parenthood was a primary
purpose of § 1409 (a) (4), which requires fathers to legitimate paternity. As such,
the Nguyen Court asserted this as an important governmental interest without cit-
ing any authority or legislative history in support. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060.
165. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2070 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166. For a further discussion, see infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
167. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060 (finding father's presence at birth not in-
controvertible proof of fatherhood); Miller, 523 U.S. at 436 (same).
168. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2070 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 2060 (noting unique verifiability of mother-child relation is doc-
umented by birth certificate or hospital records); cf id. at 2070 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing majority for not questioning verification through such
means). The Court overlooked the reality that a mother-child blood relationship
is "immediately obvious" only at the moment of birth, not thereafter. See Augus-
tine-Adams, supra note 3, at 107 n.33 (citing cases of baby-switching mistakes made
by hospitals).
170. See UNICEF, supra note 18, available at http://www.unicef.org/pon98/
pon98.pdf at 10-11 (studying birth registration process in various countries); Au-
gustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 107-08 (finding registration of child's birth in for-
eign countries to be tentative rather than reliable).
171. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing MillWs sex-neutral example that
Congress could have alternatively required all parents to prove biological
parenthood in order to convey citizenship); Miller, 523 U.S. at 436 (discussing
same sex-neutral alternative).
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clear and convincing evidence) and legal fatherhood (by means of legiti-
mation, adjudication or formal acknowledgement of paternity) "to ensure
an [equally] acceptable documentation" is not substantially related to the
goal of assuring a biological parent-child relationship. 172
2. Second Governmental Interest
With regards to the second governmental interest, the Court again
turned to the biology of birth to justify subordinating parental status. 173
First, the Court again offered no proof that the opportunity to foster ties
between the potential citizen, the citizen parent and the United States was
Congress' aim in enacting'section 1409(a) (4).174 Instead, the Nguyen
Court proclaimed to "ascertain the purpose of [section 1409(a) (4)] by
drawing logical conclusions from its text, structure, and operation." 175
Consequently, the Court felt free to legislate post hoc the "opportunity or
potential" to foster such ties without grounding it in any evidence. 17 6 Sec-
ond, it is only by diluting the governmental interest to require only a
demonstrated "opportunity" to develop such a relationship, rather than
requiring an actual relationship, that the asserted ends fit with the means
used under intermediate scrutiny. 177 As a result, the Court denied its own
precedent admonishing against such practices. 178
Furthermore, the Nguyen Court characterizes legitimation of paternity
as an "unremarkable step" which functions as a "reasonable substitute" for
the opportunity "inherent in the event of birth.' 79 Thus, under the
Court's analysis, the affirmative act of legitimation puts a father on the
same footing as a mother giving birth. Even assuming arguendo that foster-
ing ties is an important governmental interest, how does legitimation, in-
172. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060 (explaining that legitimation options were
designed to ensure equally acceptable documentation of paternity).
173. See id. at 2061-62 (discussing congressional concern for class of out-of-
wedlock citizens born abroad to American servicemen and alien mothers); Miller,
523 U.S. at 438-39 (same). There are no congressional hearings or other forms of
legislative history supporting the same argument that appears in Nguyen and Miller.
174. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061 (failing to cite to any authority underlying
second purported governmental interest); Miller, 523 U.S. at 438 (same).
175. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2063.
176. Compare id. at 2061 (citing to Stevens' plurality opinion in Miller as sup-
port for proposition), with Miller, 523 U.S. at 438 (pointing to no other sources to
uphold proposition that fostering ties between out-of-wedlock child and parent,
and, in turn,.United States, is important governmental interest).
177. Compare Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2064 (stating that § 1409(a) (4) should not
be invalidated because Congress elected to advance less demanding governmental
interest); with id. at 2071-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The majority's asserted
end, at best, is a simultaneously watered-down and beefed-up version of this
interest.").
178. For a further discussion, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2071-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that major-
ity's focus on "opportunity or potential" to develop ties is type of hypothesized
rationale that is insufficient under intermediate scrutiny).
179. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2062 (explaining holding).
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cluding a child obtaining an order of paternity from a court over the
express objection of the father, serve as a reasonable substitute for "the
opportunity manifest between mother and child at the time of birth?" 18 0
The answer is that it is not a substitute at all, let alone a reasonable one.
Legitimation fails as a reasonable substitute because it is based on un-
proven gendered hypotheses. 18 1 Specifically, the assumption is that the
act of birth creates the opportunity to foster ties between parent and
child. 182 The assumption, however, does not require that such ties ever
develop, as in the case of Nguyen.18 3 There, the mother of Vietnamese
descent abandoned the child at birth. 184 Even assuming she were the citi-
zen parent who abandoned her child, that child would be considered a
U.S. citizen even if that child never establishes ties with the country. 185 In
contrast, citizenship did not convey even though Nguyen's father did es-
tablish a strong relationship with Nguyen, who lived in the U.S. since age
180. See id. (explaining holding); Miller, 523 U.S. at 486 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that adjudication "does little to assure any tie" develops between par-
ent and child).
181. For a further discussion, see infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
182. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061 (finding that because of biology, father is
not presented with same opportunity as mother to bond with child); Miller, 523
U.S. at 438 (same). Somehow, the Court equated taking affirmative actions of
legitimation with giving birth and used biology as a means of subordinating paren-
tal status. See id. at 485 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing fit between means used
and purported end of statute). In Miller, Justice Breyer noted that the validity of
§ 1409(a) (4) depended on "the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers to care for their children, or to develop caring relationships
with their children." Id. at 482-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the law in treating mothers and fathers differently was "shap-
ing government policy to fit and reinforce the stereotype or historic pattern." Id.
at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This Court has long recognized that the govern-
ment should not rely on "overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females." United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Following the reasoning of the Court, all foreign-born children of unmarried
American mothers embody the United States nation at birth. The children of un-
married American fathers, however, are incapable of similarly personifying the
U.S. without legitimation. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 111 ("The nation
is, thus, marked not just with biological ties but also with social ties, those social
ties that [Miller] believed unmarried men do not and perhaps cannot provide.").
183. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 485 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that mere
knowledge of birth by mother does not necessitate development of ties between
parent and child).
The presumption that fathers have an inherently less natural relationship with
their children than mothers is belied by the facts of Nguyen where the father served
as the primary caregiver. To penalize him as a father by placing additional obliga-
tions on him solely because he is the male parent is unjust. The law is also out of
sync with the nationally and internationally recognized need for the elimination of
gender stereotypes and runs contrary to the proactive measures governments have
committed to promote equality between men and women.
184. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057 (noting facts).
185. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 439-40 (finding that failure to establish ties with
citizen parent and United States does not qualify legitimacy or importance of
interest).
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six.1 8 6 Because of the Court's reliance on biology, the "very event of birth"
satisfies for the mother but not the father the opportunity to foster ties,
even if that opportunity is never realized. 187
B. Practical Impact of Upholding Section 1409(a)(4) on the Basis of Biology
In Miller and Nguyen, the Court purposefully grounded the require-
ments for jus sanguinis citizenship in the biology of birth and then essen-
tialized those requirements on the basis of gender to justify subordinating
parental status.188 Specifically, in adhering to gender essentialism
grounded in biology, the Court adopted a monolithic notion of women's
and men's experiences which required no justification for the differential
treatment. 189 Consequently, the practical effect of the Court's analysis in
upholding section 1409(a) on these grounds is the reinforcement and
management of gender schemas, which profoundly impact both citizen
parents and their foreign-born out-of-wedlock children. 190
In particular, section 1409(a) maintains the gender schemas of un-
wed women as sexually responsible and unwed men as sexually irresponsi-
ble.19 1 As such, when unwed American mothers automatically convey
citizenship to their foreign-born out-of-wedlock children, they also take on
the financial debt for supporting these children (making them sexually
responsible). 192 In contrast, unwed American fathers cannot convey citi-
zenship unless they first establish a biological, 193 financial 194 and legal' 95
relationship with their foreign-born out-of-wedlock children. Without
these affirmative acts, unwed American fathers can withhold conveyance
of citizenship and skirt their financial responsibility for supporting their
186. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (noting facts). For a further discussion,
see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
187. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2062. For a further discussion, see supra notes
180-86 and accompanying text.
188. For a further discussion, see infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion on gender essentialism, see supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text.
190. For a further discussion, see infra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
191. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2062 (grounding importance of second govern-
mental interest in concern for sexual irresponsibility of American servicemen sta-
tioned abroad); Miller, 523 U.S. at 438-39 (same).
192. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2076 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that
§ 1409(a) functions to place burden of out-of-wedlock children on unwed
mothers).
193. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1) (1994) (requiring unwed citizen fathers to es-
tablish blood relation to child by clear and convincing evidence).
194. See § 1409(a)(3) (requiring unwed citizen father, unless deceased, to
submit written statement agreeing to provide financial support while out-of-wed-
lock child is minor).
195. See § 1409(a) (4) (requiring unwed citizen father to legitimate, formally
acknowledge or adjudicate paternity while child is minor).
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children.' 9 6 With these steps, those fathers wishing to overcome their
gender schema of sexual irresponsibility are burdened more than their
similarly-situated women counterparts. In sum, while unwed citizen
mothers must be sexually responsible, unwed citizen fathers need not be
and are statutorily discouraged to be similarly sexually responsible.1 97
The reinforcement and management of these gender schemas has re-
alistic implications on the children born abroad and out-of-wedlock. 198
Mainly, the statute perpetuates dead-beat dads by imposing the three addi-
tional requirements for fatherhood. 199 While statistics confirm the rise in
single-parent families, recent studies have begun to examine the harsh
consequences of such a family structure on the out-of-wedlock children.200
Withholding of U.S. citizenship denies the out-of-wedlock children of citi-
zen fathers the same "opportunity or potential" for emotional and finan-
cial support available to the children of unwed mothers who acquire
automatic citizenship at birth. 20 1 For example, if a citizen father actively
chooses not to fulfill the requirements for conferring citizenship on his
foreign-born out-of-wedlock child, the child is precluded from utilizing
domestic child support laws. 2 0 2 Consequently, section 1409(a)(4) per-
196. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1682 (finding § 1409(a) coercive because it
assumes and perpetuates full responsibility for out-of-wedlock children to mothers,
leaving similarly-situated men free from burdens of parenthood).
197. See id. (finding § 1409(a) coercive).
198. For a further discussion, see infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
199. See § 1409 (requiring additional steps be taken before child can acquire
citizenship from citizen father); UNICEF, THE PROGRESS OF NATIONS 1996: Absent
Fathers Linked to Economic Pressures, available at http://www.unicef.org/pon96/inab-
sent.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2002) (discussing economic pressures borne by un-
wed mothers generally, and comparatively based upon race) [hereinafter UNICEF
1996].
200. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Women's Law Center at 9-10, Nguyen
v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) ("According to the Census Bureau, in
1998 there were 14 million parents raising their minor children whose other natu-
ral parent did not live with them."); UNICEF 1996, supra note 200, available at
http://www.unicef.org/pon96/inabsent.htm (discussing economic pressures asso-
ciated with lack of father's presence in home).
Only 10 industrialized nations have recent statistics on the numbers of
children growing up without a father in the home. At the foot of the list
is the United States with 21.2% of its children living in solo-mother fami-
lies. At the opposite end of the scale, only 4.4% of Italian children are in
homes without a father. The steep rise in solo-parent families began in
the 1960s.'. . . The most obvious result [of this trend] is a rise in mothers
and children living in poverty. In the US, a child living in a solo-mother
family is five times as likely to live below the national poverty line, as de-
fined by the' Luxembourg Income Study.
Id.
201. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2061 (2001) (explaining that legitima-
tion provides unwed father same "opportunity or potential" to develop meaningful
relationship with foreign-born out-of-wedlock child that unwed mother has as re-
sult of giving birth).
202. Domestic laws are unavailable to persons located in foreign countries.
Consequently, domestic laws cannot reach the unwed citizen fathers to require
child support. The foreign-born out-of-wedlock Ameriasian children of American
[Vol. 47: p. 707
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petuates the gender schema of sexual irresponsibility for men.
For unwed citizen parents, the reinforcement and management of
these gender schemas also functions to make fatherhood a legal choice,
but relegates motherhood to a function of biology.203 Specifically, the
Court's ruling in Miller and Nguyen proposes that biological differences
matter for single women and men in conveying citizenship, not for all
women and men.20 4 Married women and men are not similarly subject to
the Court's biological determinism because Congress has statutorily re-
jected subordinating their parental status.20 5
The biological link between unwed mothers and their children is so-
cially meaningful to the United States, thus citizenship laws grant unwed
women the power to sire citizens. 20 6 In contrast, the United States finds
the same biological link between unwed fathers and their children to be
immaterial absent legitimation. Consistent with the arcane principles of
coverture, the notion that a father has to legally create a relationship with
his child through affirmative steps implicates the absence of any real rela-
tionship.20 7 While biology may be the obvious defense to section 1409, it
does not dictate that we uphold a mother-child relationship to the detri-
ment of a father-child relationship. 20 8
V. OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM
Conceptually, recognizing that section 1409(a) exists as a matter of
choice not dictated by biology requires that society not solely burden wo-
men with sexual responsibility.20 9 Furthermore, the practical implications
of upholding the provision are so severe that Congress must revisit this
issue.2 10 Given Congress' broad plenary power to decide immigration and
servicemen are particularly disadvantaged because few can locate or gain support
from their citizen fathers. See, e.g.,Joseph M. Ahern, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of
Mind: United States Immigration Law and Policy as Applied to Filipino-Ameriasians, 1
PAc. RiM. L. & POL'YJ. 105, 112 (1992) (explaining that only fifteen percent of
these Filipino-Ameriasian children have acquired U.S. citizenship through their
unwed citizen fathers).
203. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 98-99 (noting that naturalized ap-
proaches to gender reinforce gender stereotypes and make fatherhood legal and
motherhood natural).
204. See id. at 101-02 (finding Miller plurality naturalized motherhood to jus-
tify exclusion of children born out-of-wedlock to American men).
205. See Act of May 24, 1934, § 1 (terminating discriminatory treatment of
married citizen mothers and allowing them to convey citizenship to their foreign-
born children). Congress statutorily ended discrimination faced by married citi-
zen mothers in 1934 "to establish complete equality between American men and
women in matter of citizenship for themselves and for their children." S. REP. No.
73-865, at 1 (1934).
206. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 104 (explaining consequenes of
essentialism).
207. See id. (explaining consquences of essentialism).
208. See id. at 135-37 (finding essentialism harmful).
209. See id. at 135 (finding essentialism harmful).
210. For a further discussion, see supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
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naturalization issues, the legislature certainly has the right to revisit this
gendered subordination of parental status.
2 11
Even if the legislature does not voluntarily wish to revisit this provi-
sion, section 1409(a) may be called into question if the United States rati-
fies the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW).2 1 2 CEDAW is an international multilateral
treaty that binds virtually all member countries. 21 3 Presently, the United
States is not bound by CEDAW as it has signed, but not yet ratified, the
treaty.
2 1 4
If ratified, Congress will likely have to revisit section 1409(a) since it
appears to be incompatible with CEDAW's aim. 215 Targeting the tie be-
211. For a further discussion on the plenary power doctrine, see supra notes
76-92 and accompanying text.
212. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378, available at http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) (utilizing pre-
amble to outline need for equality of women in areas of civil rights, reproductive
rights and human rights) [hereinafter CEDAW On-line]. Specifically, Article 9 of
CEDAW seeks equality for women and men with regard to their own nationality
and that of their children. See CEDAW On-line, supra, available at http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (Article 9) ("States Parties shall grant
women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.").
Several countries have acknowledged their international obligation to change
their discriminatory citizenship laws by withdrawing reservations to Article 9 of
CEDAW following such legislative changes. For a discussion on these countries,
see supra note 19, and accompanying text. In 1999, the Republic of Korea with-
drew its reservation to Article 9 following a change in its Nationality Act, which had
previously required children born to a Korean mother and foreign father to take
the nationality of their father. See United Nations Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, Declaration and Reservations to CEDAW, available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/htmi/menu3/b/treaty9_asp.htm.
213. See Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in 1 MUL-
TILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS AS AT 31 DE-
CEMBER 2000, at 228-29 [hereinafter CEDAW Status] (indicating that CEDAW has
been signed by United States); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 12-
13, Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (discussing provisions of
CEDAW).
214. See CEDAW Status, supra note 213, at 229 (indicating that CEDAW has
been signed by United States). The United States (signed July 17, 1980), Afghani-
stan (signed August 14, 1980) and Sao Tome and Principe (signed October 31,
1995) are the only remaining countries that have signed CEDAW, but have not yet
agreed to be bound by ratification, accession or succession. See id. at 228-29 (pro-
viding breakdown of status of 166 party countries).
215. For a further discussion on the provisions and goals of CEDAW, see infra
notes 216-19 and accompanying text. In Article 9, CEDAW specifically requires
participant countries to "grant women equal rights with respect to the nationality
of their children." CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (Article 9). While there is some indica-
tion that in 1980 the legislature may have found the U.S. federal citizenship laws
to be consistent with Article 9, much has changed since then. See Multilateral Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Execu-
tive R, 1980 U.S.T. Lexis 150, at *26-27 (Letter of Submittal by Pres. Carter with
accompanying Memorandum of Law by Edmund Muskie, Oct. 23, 1980) (finding
[Vol. 47: p. 707
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tween discrimination and women's reproductive rights, the preamble ex-
plicitly proclaims that "the role of women in procreation should not be a
basis for, discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a
sharing of responsibility between men and women and society as a
whole."216 The preamble also formally recognizes the historic role culture
and tradition play in the subjugation of women by demanding "a change
in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in
the family."
217
As such, CEDAW grants the power to "take all appropriate measures"
necessary to achieve full equality between women and men.218 This in-
cludes enacting legislation that modifies existing discriminatory social and
cultural gender schemas so as to eliminate any customs and practices
"based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."2 19
The grant of such extensive power combined with the mandate of
Article 9, which demands equality, for women with regard to their own
nationality and that of their children, enables Congress to modify section
no potential areas of concern requiring implementing legislation or reservations,
declarations and understandings with respect to Article 9). This change in times is
evidenced by the concern expressed by at least four current Justices of the Su-
preme Court in Miller and Nguyen. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer in Nguyen, and Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer in Miller found
§ 1409(a)'s requirement for legitimation of paternity (but not maternity) to be a
form of latent discrimination against women. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053,
2075-76 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Section 1409(a) (4) is thus paradig-
matic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from
responsibility, for nonmarital children."); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-69
(1998) (noting that historical disregard or respect for mother-child relationship
and for children born abroad "counsels skeptical examination" of purported justi-
fications). Consequently, if CEDAW is ratified, it appears likely that at least four
currentJustices on the Supreme Court will support reconsideration of the impact
of § 1409(a).
216. CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/
multi/texts/BH769.txt (Preamble); see Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 12-
13, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing same).
217. CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/
multi/texts/BH769.txt (Preamble); see Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW~at 12-
13, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing same). The desire to nullify old gender schemas
necessitates placing common responsibility on women and men "in the upbringing
and development of their children ...." CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available
at http://flecher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (Article 5); see Brief of Amici
Curiae Equality NOW at 12-13, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing same).
218. See CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (Preamble, Article 5, Article 7, Article 8)
("Determined to implement the principles set forth in [this treaty] and, for that
purpose, to adopt the measures required for the elimination of such discrimina-
tion in all its forms and manifestations."); see Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW
at 12-13, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing same).
219. CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/
multi/texts/BH769.txt (Article 5); see Brief of Amici Curiae Equality NOW at 12-
13, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (citing same).
37
Lalwani: The Intelligent Wickedness of U.S. Immigration Law Conferring Cit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47: p. 707
1409(a) appropriately. 220 If Congress does revisit this issue, voluntarily or
due to CEDAW's ratification, one such appropriate revision could be to
allow a foreign-born child of a U.S. citizen to claim citizenship irrespective
of the citizen parent's sex.22 1 Under this revision, any foreign-born child
of a citizen parent could apply for citizenship based upon clear and con-
vincing evidence demonstrating a blood relationship between the poten-
tial citizen child and the citizen parent.222 Such a proposal meets the
mandates of Article 9, satisfies proof of biological parenthood and deters
fraudulent citizenship claims while demanding both women and men be
sexually responsible beings. 2 23 Consequently, there still exists a viable op-
portunity to reform 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court, with Congress' consent, acted to
uphold and reinforce the gender-based schemas perpetuated by section
1409(a). A close examination of Miller and Nguyen confirms that ground-
ing the criteria for jus sanguinis citizenship in the biology of birth and then
220. See CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (Preamble, Article 9) (stating, in pream-
ble, CEDAW's determination "to adopt the measures required" to eliminate dis-
crimination "in all its forms and manifestations," including Article 9's mandate to
provide women and their children with equality in acquiring citizenship).
221. Alternatively, Congress could require U.S. women to meet the height-
ened requirements applied to U.S. men to convey citizenship. This alternative,
however, would be as problematic as the current rule because it would make wo-
men sexually irresponsible as well as men. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at
136 (proposing revised jus sanguinis citizenship law for United States). Also, it
would be more exclusionary than our existing law. See id. In contrast, by allowing
fathers the ability to convey citizenship on the same generous terms as women
would serve to include the children of color who are disproportionately excluded
under the present rule. See id.
222. In essence, this proposal recommends retaining § 1409(a)(1), but apply-
ing it equally to both women and men. For a discussion on the requirements un-
wed citizen mothers must currently meet to convey citizenship to foreign-born out-
of-wedlock children, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
223. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (requiring proof of clear and convincing evi-
dence of blood relationship from foreign-born out-of-wedlock children of unwed
citizen fathers); 1986 Hearings, supra note 53, at 150 (proposing what is now
§ 1409(a) (1) to deter fraudulent claims); Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2070 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (finding it logical that clear and convincing evidence of blood relation-
ship meets legislative goal of proving biological parenthood). Because this propo-
sal establishes a unitary standard to convey citizenship to all foreign-born out-of-
wedlock children, it treats all women, men and their children equally in satisfac-
tion of CEDAW. See CEDAW On-line, supra note 212, available at http://
fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH769.txt (satisfying Article 9). Finally, as dis-
cussed in the previous section, allowing citizenship to convey automatically upon
clear and convincing evidence of biological parenthood destroys the gender
schema of unwed men as sexually irresponsible. See Augustine-Adams, supra note
3, at 138-39 (proposing revised jus sanguinis citizenship rule for United States).
For a further discussion on gender schemas and the practical implications of the
Court's holdings, see supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
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gendering that discrimination is a calculated social choice unrelated to
biological dictates. 224 This social choice has profound repercussions for
the citizen parents and their out-of-wedlock children. Recognition of this
intelligent wickedness mandates we not socialize our nation to burden
only women with the responsibility for their sexual choices.
Manisha Lalwani
224. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 3, at 98 (comparing Miller to foreign
case law of Botswana, Canada, Bangladesh and Japan reveals that social meaning
ascribed to biology girds U.S. citizenship law).
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